Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaulating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole by Squire, Ryan C
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 4 Article 4
5-15-1998
Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaulating
the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth
Amendment Loophole
Ryan C. Squire
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryan C. Squire Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaulating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25
Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1998)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol25/iss4/4
Effectuating Principles of Federalism:
Reevaluating the Federal Spending Power as the
Great Tenth Amendment Loophole
"If not only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be
thrown into the fire at once."- James Madison, 1792'
What is needed more than anything else is a process of reeducation in the values
of federalism that the Framers themselves had, and that we must have if the
system is going to work properly. No matter how you write it, it won't work if
we don't believe in federalism. - Justice Antonin Scalia, 1997
I. INTRODUCTION
Explaining the character of the federal government, James Madison
stated that the government's jurisdiction "extends to certain enumerated
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty."' Madison and other Framers viewed a structure of power
divided between the federal and state governments as necessary to pro-
tect individual liberties.' The Framers' structure was designed principally
to guarantee rights to individuals by creating a system which diffused
power by enabling the state governments to restrain the federal govern-
ment, and enabling the federal government to restrain the state govern-
ments.' The individual sovereignty of the federal and state governments
1. See 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 179, 180 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
1981).
2. On Liberty & Limits: Whose Law, Whose Order? (PBS television broadcast,
Apr. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Liberty & Limits].
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
see also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376-77 (1997).
4. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Madison explained that dividing power among and within the state and federal
governments served to preserve individual liberties. See id, No. 51, at 348-51.
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (noting that "[i]t may safely be received as an axiom in our political system
that the state governments will in all possible contingencies afford complete security
against invasions of the public liberties by the national authority").
was critical in order to sustain this delicate balance of power in which
the federal and state governments were clearly accountable to the people
and neither the federal government nor the state governments retained
the ability to exceed their respective authority.6 The concept of "feder-
alism" embodies this division of power between the federal and state
governments.7 Federalism, however, is not merely an unintended conse-
quence of the Constitution' nor a statement of the preferred system of
American government.' Instead, the Constitution itself commands a sys-
tem of federalism.0
This Comment suggests that although Madison correctly assessed the
structure of American government, that structure has evolved over the
course of the twentieth century to a point at which the states retain little
of the envisioned "residuary and inviolable sovereignty." The United
States Supreme Court has sanctioned, and often initiated, this develop-
ment.11 This Comment posits that the delicate balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the governments of the several states
has been tipped ever so slightly in favor of the federal government, blur-
ring the lines of political accountability, and consequently giving rise to
the danger of encroachment upon the protections of individual liber-
ties.2
The expansion of the Spending Clause power 13 over the course of the
twentieth century has rendered illusory the protections of state sover-
eignty and ensuing protections against tyranny. In United States v. But-
ler14 the Supreme Court unwittingly established a path toward eroding
the principles of federalism by interpreting the spending power, as had
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
7. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 544 n.46
(1988) (defining federalism as either the balance between state and state power or
the balance between state and federal power).
8. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law,
79 VA. L. REV. 633, 633 (1993).
12. It is well recognized that the Supremacy Clause grants the federal government
a decisive advantage in the balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991). This Comment analyzes
whether the balance has been tipped beyond this point in favor of the federal gov-
ernment.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States."). The last portion of this
clause is also known as the Welfare Clause.
14. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Alexander Hamilton, as restricted only by the General Welfare Clause,
and not, as Madison had envisioned, as restricted by the enumerated
powers.15 Thus, the Supreme Court permitted Congress to spend in or-
der to promote the general welfare of the nation, unrestricted by state
intervention.16 In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,7 Helvering v. Da-
vis," and Buckley v. Valeo,"9 the Court granted Congress almost unlim-
ited spending power by permitting Congress to define the general wel-
fare. Berman v. Parker" further enhanced the spending power by effec-
tively holding that when Congress spends the object of the expenditure
is presumed to be within the general welfare.2' Finally, in South Dakota
v. Dole,22 the Court held that Congress, indeed the federal government,
may place conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, so long as the
conditions are reasonably related to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.2 As Justice O'Connor explained in her
dissent in Dole, the Court appears to require only some relationship-not
necessarily a reasonable one.
Two additional factors contribute to the federal government's ability to
use the spending power to achieve federal objectives. First, the Sixteenth
Amendment,2" which permits Congress to tax income virtually at will,
guarantees that Congress has literally trillions of dollars to spend in fur-
therance of its objectives. A seemingly insurmountable national debt
confirms that Congress has found ways to spend trillions more than its
already tremendous revenues.26 Second, federal taxpayers have little, if
any, ability to challenge federal spending in the courts, due to the restric-
tive standing rules imposed upon such challenges.27 Federal spending
15. See id. at 65-66.
16. See id.
17. 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937).
18. 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
19. 424 U.S. 1, 90-92 (1976).
20. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21. See id. at 33; see also infra notes 221-37 (discussing Berman).
22. 483 U.S. 203, 206-09 (1987).
23. Id. at 207.
24. See id. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.").
26. See Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, What's So Bad About the National Debt?, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 9, 1997 (discussing JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE
EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT (1997)), available in Westlaw.
27. See infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text (discussing standing require-
which is not closely related to a federal taxation scheme is virtually insu-
lated from review.2"
This Comment discusses the Supreme Court's notion of federalism and
asserts that a virtually unrestricted spending power fails to give full cre-
dence to the design of our federalist structure. More importantly, an un-
restricted spending power fails to adhere to the Constitution's command
for dual spheres of federal and state sovereignty.9 This Comment focus-
es primarily on the Tenth Amendment,"° simply because that Amend-
ment enunciates explicitly the Constitution's requirement of federal-
ism. 1 This Comment asserts that, while the federal government should
have broad authority to spend federal revenues, the federal government
should not be permitted to use the spending power to regulate beyond
its enumerated powers or as a tool for coercing and commandeering the
states into implementing federal directives or regulations. In the area of
conditional federal funds, the Court could accomplish both of these ob-
jectives simply by enforcing its "reasonably related" test, and by requiring
more than an "attenuated or tangential relationship."32 Put simply, this
Comment maintains that a refusal to confine the spending power, espe-
cially in light of the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez to confine
the federal commerce power, discussed below, permits Congress to regu-
late-through the spending power-where Lopez might otherwise deny
ments for spending challenges).
28. See id.
29. This Comment does not suggest that "states' rights" must be given greater
weight than federal power in any political sense. Rather, this Comment seeks to ex-
plain the federalist design and argues that both federal and state governments have
an appropriate and important role in that design. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971). The Court stated:
The [Federalist] concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in
our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these
courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sen-
sitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern-
ments ....
Id. Thus, this Comment merely asserts that the current federal-state system is out of
proper balance, and federal power has expanded so as to exclude the states from
maintaining their proper role.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respective-
ly, or to the people.").
31. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
32. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 252-69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Dole); infra notes 398-435 and accompanying text (discussing this Comment's sugges-
tion).
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regulation under an enumerated power such as the Commerce Clause.
"Although Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it
has the power to legislate [or regulate] only for delegated purposes. The
distinction is crucial if any semblance of a federal government of limited
powers is to be preserved." '
Recently, in New York v. United States,' United States v. Lopez,35
and Printz v. United States,36 the Court signaled a desire to "resusci-
tate"37 principles of federalism. Although the Court breathed life into
federalism, the Court left federalism's heart lifeless by implicitly approv-
ing continued use of the almost limitless spending power. Nevertheless,
these decisions should be viewed with optimism as steps toward a goal
of realizing the Constitution's command for our federalist structure. This
Comment attempts to take the next step in protecting against the blur-
ring of political accountability, by closing the giant loophole around the
Tenth Amendment: the Spending Clause power. Specifically, this Com-
ment examines the foundation and operation of federal power not in a
vacuum but rather in light of both the Constitutional principles underly-
ing the structure of our government-protection of personal liberties and
clear political accountability-and the expansion of federal power. This
Comment asserts that continued adherence to the broad interpretation of
the spending power is inconsistent with early history and the principles
underlying the holdings in New York, Lopez, and Printz. This Comment
does not suggest that the federal government should lose its ability to
control the destination of federal funds. This Comment instead suggests
that the Court at the least adhere to its already-imposed restrictions and
33. Amicus Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. at 19,
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 217 (1987) (No. 86-260).
34. Id.
35. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
37. See Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the
Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363 (1996). Before New York and Lopez, the
Court maintained a limited view of state power vis-A-vis federal power. In United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court noted that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a [mere] truism that all is retained [by the states] which has
not been surrendered [to the federal government]." Id. at 124. Moreover, Justice Story
stated that "'this amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just reasoning,
is a necessary rule of interpreting the constitution. Being an instrument of limited
and enumerated powers . . .what is not conferred, is withheld.'" New York, 505 U.S.
at 156 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 752 (1833)).
recognize that its holdings permit Congress to circumvent the Court's
enunciated protections of federalism. Ultimately, this Comment con-
cludes that the Court could effectuate principles of federalism in the
spending power arena without departing significantly, if at all, from its
federalism and spending power jurisprudence.
Part II of this Comment examines Tenth Amendment principles and
the revival of those principles emanating from New York, Lopez, and
Printz. Part III analyzes the origin and current status of the spending
power." Part IV presents the ramifications of the currently limitless in-
terpretation of the spending power and the need to reassess the current
interpretation of that power.4" Part V briefly explores alternatives for re-
moving the impediments to a proper federal-state balance." Part VI con-
cludes this Comment, suggesting that the Court give full credence to the
Framer's design of self-governance and to the Court's own decisions.
II. REVIVAL OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT AS A LIMITATION ON
FEDERAL POWER
Early in the twentieth century, the Court viewed the Tenth Amendment
as a mere "truism."42 This view, that all powers not conveyed are with-
held,4" although perhaps technically correct, has since cramped the
Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.44 Recently, however, the Court
38. See infra notes 42-179 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 180-280 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 281-397 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 398435 and accompanying text.
42. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also supra note 37
(discussing Darby and Justice Joseph Story on this point).
43. This concept is known as enumeration-that is, Congress retains only those
powers that are specifically enumerated and delineated in the Constitution, and no
others. See id.
44. In Darby, the Court said:
There is nothing in the history of the [Tenth Amendment's] adoption to sug-
gest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the nation-
al and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution be-
fore the amendment, or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that
the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and
that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id. The Court's recent decisions in Printz and New York appear to mark a shift
toward viewing the Tenth Amendment with greater importance-or at least with
greater respect for its affirmation of our system of government. It is interesting to
note that some Framers, including Madison, initially opposed a Bill of Rights with the
belief (1) that a bill of specific rights might tend to preclude a finding of other
rights-that is, if some rights were specified, it might be thought that only those
existed; and (2) that a bill of specific rights was unnecessary because, in any event,
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has characterized several of its decisions circumscribing and confining
federal power as Tenth Amendment cases.45 Thus, the Tenth Amend-
ment is the appropriate focus for discussion because it affirmatively
states the concept of enumeration, and because the Court itself has re-
cently chosen to consider seriously the Tenth Amendment.46
A. The Proper Balance Between Federal and State Powers:
Why Federalism and the Tenth Amendment Matter
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor opened her opinion in New York v. Unit-
ed States47 by stating that the constitutional question regarding the prop-
er balance between the federal and state powers is "perhaps our oldest
question of constitutional law ... as old as the Constitution [itself]. ""
Indeed, disagreements and perceptions regarding the extent of federal
and state powers under a constitutional republic fueled the debates over
ratification of the Constitution.49 From those debates emerged the Fed-
the federal government was limited in its power by the enumerated powers, and so
the federal government could not encroach upon such areas as religion and speech.
See Hadley Arkes, The New Jural Mind: Rights Without Grounds, Without Truths,
and Without Things That Are Truly Rightful, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PIIIO-
SOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 191 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996); HADLEY
ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); David Bergland, Comment, Libertarianism,
Natural Rights and the Constitution: A Commentary on Recent Libertarian Litera-
ture, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499, 506 (1996). In other words, some opponents argued
that a Bill of Rights was, in many respects, surplusage. This is ironic, today, given
that we view the Bill of Rights, generally, as one of the most important docu-
ments-or collection of amendments-in the Constitution. Would we, as a society,
tolerate a pronouncement by the Court that the First Amendment, for example, is
mere surplusage because the enumerated powers prevent the federal government from
encroaching on those liberties outside its sphere of authority? Is not the Darby
Court's reading of the Tenth Amendment nothing more than a declaration that the
Tenth Amendment itself is surplusage? A reading of the Court's opinions in Printz
and New York, however, tends to suggest that the Tenth Amendment is not simply
surplusage.
45. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
46. In Printz, for example, the Court proclaimed the well-recognized principle that
the Tenth Amendment rendered express the Constitution's implication that the Con-
stitution "conferr[ed] upon Congress ... not all governmental powers, but only dis-
crete, enumerated ones." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
47. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48. Id. at 149.
49. Alpheus Thomas Mason, What was the Federalist-Antifederalist Debate About?,
eralist papers, written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John
Jay, which argued in favor of ratification and sought to elucidate the
scope of the new federal government.' Current litigation regarding the
boundaries of federal and state authority confirms that similar debates
continue today regarding the proper place of the states in our system."1
The Tenth Amendment embodies the principles of the Constitution's
federalist design by proclaiming that "[tihe powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 2 In explaining the
interrelationship between the Tenth Amendment and Article I limits on
Congress's authority under those powers "herein granted" by the Consti-
tution, Madison asserted the familiar truth that "[t]he powers delegated
by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and
defined" and that "[t]hose which are to remain in the State Governments
are numerous and indefinite."' During ratification, the preservation of
state sovereignty, and the concomitant balance between federal and state
authority, was deemed so important that "[e]ight of the nine original
states needed to ratify the Constitution did so only after requiring that
[such a] statement.., be added to the document."4 That statement was
the Tenth Amendment.55
One may wonder why a proper balance between federal and state
powers is important. The balance is something that one may simply take
for granted, having been taught merely that the balance exists rather
than the reasons underlying its existence.' No discussion of this issue
in THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-55 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 1979).
50. See generally. THE FEDERALIST (James Madison, Alexander Hamilton & John
Jay).
51. See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 104 (1992).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
54. Douglas W. Kmiec, Commerce, the Tenth Amendment, and Guns in Schools,
UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUC., Nov. 1995, at 4.
55. See id.
56. At most, schools likely teach that the federalist design was implemented as a
compromise between federalists and anti-federalists, as a result of anti-federalists'
fears that federal power would engulf the states' sovereignty. Unfortunately, present-
ing the issue in this manner reveals little about the balance between the federal and
state governments, that is, the appropriate roles for each. To view the Constitution's
design merely as a compromise, although perhaps not historically incorrect, is to ig-
nore the fact that both the state and federal governments have interrelated, not sepa-
rate and distinct, roles: to protect freedom. Thus, the federalist structure is, and was,
more than a mere compromise. Indeed, the structure of federalism was a "way of
redefining the European model of securing government in one person-a monarch."
Liberty & Limits, supra note 2. Instead, the "Framers saw this as a way of securing
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would be complete nor persuasive without presenting the reasons behind
the Framers' federalist design.
1. A Proper Balance Protects Individual Liberties and Guards Against
the Blurring of Political Accountability
Principally, the Framers designed the federal-state balance to secure
individual liberties by establishing the state and federal governments to
guard against abuses of power by the other.57 Hamilton, an outspoken
advocate of federal power, articulated the principal benefit of a system
of government divided between federal and state powers:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the General Government will at
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these
will have the same disposition towards the General Government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their
rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of
redress."
Hamilton thus viewed the federalist design as protecting against "the
attempts of [either] government to establish a tyranny."59 As Justice
O'Connor articulated in Gregory v. Ashcroft,' "a healthy balance of
power." Id.
57. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 510 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 790 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally NELSON ROCKEFELLER, THE
FUTURE OF FEDERALISM 10 (1962); Richard P. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Prob-
lems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1241-44 (1977).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally Aviam Soifer, Tru-
isms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending Power, 57
U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 814-20 (1986) (explaining how the process of amending the
Constitution has granted the federal government greater authority than under the
original Constitution). Interestingly, Hamilton was the "most expansive expositor of
federal power," and he was "'from first to last the most nationalistic of all nation-
alists in his interpretation of the clauses of our federal Constitution.'" Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2375 n.9 (1997) (quoting C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
AND THE CONSTITUTION 199 (1964)). Thus, perhaps it is telling that the "greatest ex-
positor" would nevertheless assert the importance of the federal-state balance-or at
least recognize that the (proposed and subsequently adopted) Constitution commands
such a balance-and suggest the method by which that balance would be maintained.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
60. 510 U.S. 452 (1991). Justice O'Connor is one of the Court's most outspoken
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."61
Madison eloquently expressed a similar view regarding the value of
two separate governments over one preeminent government.62 For Madi-
son, diffusion of power was a "double security" which served to prohibit
tyranny.6
3
Justice O'Connor echoed Madison in Gregory: "If this 'double security'
is to be effective, there must be a proper balance between the States and
the Federal Government. These twin powers will act as mutual restraints
only if both are credible. "' As Justice O'Connor succinctly summarized,
"[iun the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of
liberty."6 5
advocates of maintaining a proper balance between federal and state power. See gen-
erally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor joining
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(Justice O'Connor writing for the majority); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)
(Justice O'Connor writing for the majority); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-
18 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
62. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted
to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate depart-
ments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the por-
tion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will controul each other, at the same time that each will be
controuled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350-51 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (em-
phasis added).
63. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added). The idea is that the citizens will allocate their favor to
either the federal or state governments, and the state and federal governments will
compete for the affections of the people. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 317 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that even when the citizens tend to
favor the federal government, "the State governments could have little to apprehend,
because it is only within a certain sphere, that the federal power can, in the nature
of things, be advantageously administered"). In this manner, the respective govern-
ments have the ability to check the abuses of the other. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the Framers believed freedom was
enhanced through the creation of two governments as opposed to just one); New
York, 505 U.S at 180; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffu-
sion of sovereign power.").
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The underlying premise is one of political accountability and responsi-
bility.' "'Federalism serves to assign political accountability, not to ob-
scure it,"'' 7 by allocating to citizens the ability to change their favor be-
tween the federal and state governments, permitting each government to
check abuses of the other.' Thus, for example, when the citizens view
the state governments as holding too much power, the citizens, in theory,
may allocate their favor towards the federal government to curb the
states' abuses and vice versa.6 9
The implicit component of political accountability is citizens' political
awareness. In order to allocate their favor, "citizens must have some
means of knowing which of the two governments to hold ac-
countable."" If the balance of power is tipped too far in favor of either
the state governments or federal government by constitutional interpreta-
tion rather than by the people, then "the boundaries between the spheres
of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
would become illusory."7' Citizens would be uncertain whom to hold
responsible for disfavored actions. Likewise, if the federal government
tips the balance too far in its own favor by coercing or directing state or
local officials to regulate according to federal commands, then the state
and local governments are unable to "regulate in accordance with the
view of the local electorate."72 The federal government may insulate it-
66. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2377-78 (1997).
67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting FI'C v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
68. See THE FEDERAUST No. 46, at 317 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). "Though on the surface the idea may seem counterintuitive, it was the insight
of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of two governments, not
one." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). For example, by Constitutional amendment, citizens granted to Congress the
ability to address civil rights issues. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. The
citizens also granted to the states the ability to regulate the "transportation", "deliv-
ery," or "use" of "intoxicating liquors." See U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2. Constitutional
amendment is the most express method by which citizens may shift power from the
federal government to the state government or vice versa.
70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Congressman Paul
Gillmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment
to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HAnv. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1994) (explaining
Congress's ability to obscure accountability through directives to state and local gov-
ernments).
72. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992); see also FERC v. Mis-
self from public disapproval by leaving the state and local officials to
bear this burden,73 again rendering the citizens unable to ascertain the
entity responsible for disfavored actions.74 The resulting inability of the
citizens to hold the proper government accountable "is more dangerous
even than devolving too much authority to the remote central power."75
Thus, a proper balance between federal and state authority helps to
ensure that citizens are able to hold accountable those state or federal
officials responsible for disfavored actions and implicitly ensures not
only that federal and state officials will be responsive to the needs of
their respective electorates, but that the officials will indeed have the
ability to be responsive to their electorates. Indeed, a properly balanced
system of federalism ensures liberty by maintaining local self-gover-
nance. 6 In our republican democracy, in which citizens choose their
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that
"[c]itizens . . . cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are
devoted to reviewing proposals formulated by a faraway national legislature . . . [but]
citizens must retain the power to govern ... their local problems"); D. Bruce La
Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-the Alternative to
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 639-65 (1985); Deborah
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 61-62 (1988).
73. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169. When the federal government commands the
states to implement federal objectives, the federal government is merely passing the
buck. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 & n.19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stewart,
supra note 57, at 123947; Daniel Elazar, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth, Hear-
ings on the Federal Role 32 (Oct. 1980) (suggesting that federal officials often force
state and local governments to manage unpopular programs, thereby transferring the
brunt of the political accountability to state and local officials); Comment, Redefining
the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1460,
1477-78 (1981)); see also Recent Legislation: Federalism--Intergovernmental Rela-
tions-Congress Requires a Separate, Recorded Vote for Any Provision Establishing
an Unfunded Mandate, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1469, 1472-73 (1996) [hereinafter Recent
Legislation].
74. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169; FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
75. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Harvard Law Professor Sindel recently expressed the importance of maintaining
a proper balance of federalism:
The separation of powers between the national and the state government
is an important way of securing liberty. Power has flowed to the national
government over the years; but at the same time, we haven't lost the aspira-
tion of self-government. People still want government to be close to home
and that aspiration--that people are free if they can get their hands on gov-
ernment, have it closer to home where they can reach it rather than off in
distant Washington-that sentiment, that ideal that the Framers debated, is
with us today.
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representatives, few things are as important as political accountability.
Without political accountability, citizens indeed cannot adequately
choose how to be governed nor effectively pursue self-governance.
2. By Protecting Individual Freedoms, Federalism Secures Additional
Benefits
In addition to guarding against abuses of power and the blurring of
political accountability, Professor Deborah Jones Merritt recognizes four
major advantages of a properly balanced federalist system.77 First, she
indicates that the states provide the "wellspring" of political force.7'
That is, states provide the opportunity for small political groups unable
to organize on the national level to organize on the state and local levels
thus enabling them to gain momentum from which they may someday
influence the national political process.79 Second, Professor Merritt ob-
serves that state and local governments encourage citizens to participate
in the political process by increasing access to democratic decision-mak-
ing." Personal participation likewise serves to train citizens in the dem-
ocratic process, fosters representatives' accountability, and improves
faith in democracy.8' Third, independent state and local governments
provide for American cultural diversity by permitting citizens in each
locality to design their preferred social and political environment.' Pro-
fessor Merritt asserts that "this opportunity to express different social
and cultural values is essential" to American democracy.' Finally, relat-
ed to the third advantage, and as several Justices have observed," each
Liberty & Limits, supra note 2.
77. See Merritt, supra note 72, at 67-69.
78. See id. at 70.
79. See id.; see also Powell, supra note 11, at 685-87 (discussing advantages of
federalism).
80. See Merritt, supra note 72, at 7-8.
81. See id.; see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789-90 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
82. See Merritt, supra note 72, at 8. For example, Alaska may spend $8627 per
pupil for elementary and secondary education, whereas Utah may choose to spend
only $2053. See id. at 8-9. Moreover, some states may enact stringent pollution con-
trol laws, whereas others may enact less stringent standards. See id. at 9. Even more
drastic, the City of Santa Monica, California, at least at the time of Professor
Merritt's article, had established its own desired form of social welfare programs. See
id.
83. Id. at 9.
84. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Chandler v. Flori-
state acts as a laboratory for experimenting with new and innovative
social, economic, and cultural concepts." The remainder of the nation is
free from risk should an experiment ultimately fail.' Furthermore, a
successful experiment may provide the foundation for implementing new
and innovative ideas on the national level."
3. The Constitution Commands a Proper Balance Between the Federal
and State Govermnents
Although the benefits derived from a proper balance between the fed-
eral and state powers are substantial, the Constitution itself commands a
proper balance regardless of any benefits conferred.' Thus, the princi-
pal response to the question of why federalism matters is not that feder-
alism secures a preferred system of government, but rather that the Con-
stitution requires a system of federalism.' The Supreme Court, in New
York, Lopez, and Printz, has indicated a willingness to read the
Constitution's requirement for a properly balanced federalism more seri-
ously.
The benefits derived from federalism, however, are not insignificant:
the Constitution's federalism was designed to secure liberties and free-
doms by guarding against abuses of power. The principal component of
federalism is citizens' ability to allocate their favor."0 That federalism
additionally encourages participation in the democratic process and the
development of social and cultural diversity and promotes states as the
da, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 & n.20 (1977); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
85. See Merritt, supra note 72, at 9.
86. See id.
87. See id. Unemployment compensation, no-fault insurance, minimum-wage laws,
anti-discrimination laws in housing and unemployment, and cost containment in hospi-
tals were first instituted at the state and local levels. See id.; see also FERC, 456
U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that states have pioneered many so-
cial innovations, including, inter alia, women's right to vote (Wyoming), minimum
wage laws for women and minors (Massachusetts), and environmental regulation
(Florida)). The welfare reform movement, which spawned Congress's Welfare Reform
Bill, also originated at the state level. See Neal R. Pierce, Welfare Reform: Let the
Experiments Begin, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 30, 1996, at A9. Additionally, in early
1997 President Clinton proposed a $1500 college tuition tax credit (the "Hope Schol-
arship") for students who maintain at least a B average, similar to a plan instituted
in Georgia. See Marlene Cimons & Elizabeth Shogren, Glitches Feared in Clinton
Plan for College Aid, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al.
88. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
89. See id.
90. See id.
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laboratory for social innovation9 should not be at all surprising; without
federalism's protections against governmental abuses of power and the
blurring of political accountability, citizens would be hard-pressed to
engage in self-governance-the heart of our constitutional republic.
B. The Current State of Federalism and the Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment embodies the principles of federalism. The
Amendment, however, has traveled a rugged road.' Three recent United
States Supreme Court cases illustrate the Court's current understanding
of the extent of federal power, and provide some optimism for those
who appreciate the importance of maintaining a proper federal-state bal-
ance.
1. New York v. United States: Reviving the Discussion of the Proper
Balance
New York v. United States3 is the pivotal case in the developing re-
emergence of restricting federal power. In New York, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 (LLRWPA) as an improper usurpation
of state authority and held that the federal government may not comman-
deer state legislatures to implement a federal regulatory program.'
91. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
92. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. Most of the Court's Tenth Amendment cases
before New York involved Congress's authority to require state governments to abide
by generally applicable federal laws. See id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cit-
ies, 426 U.S. at 855 (1976); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)); see also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 260 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
93. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion. See id. at
147-88. For an in-depth treatment of New York, see generally Julius Pohlenz, Note,
New York v. United States-Invalidation of the Take Title Provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 and Its Consequences, 7 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 221 (Winter 1993).
94. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
The LLRWPA required the states to provide for the disposal of waste
generated within their borders and established three compliance incen-
tives to "aid" the states in attaining this goal.95 The Court held that the
first two incentives were constitutional as within Congress's authority,
but that the third so-called "incentive" was beyond Congress's authority
and invaded the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.'
The first set of incentives-monetary incentives-provided for the pay-
ment of a certain sum to each state attaining the first wave of deadlines
for managing waste generated within its borders. 7 The second set of
incentives-access incentives-provided that sited states could charge
states failing to meet the various compliance deadlines up to quadruple
the normal surcharge for waste disposal.9 8 The third so-called incen-
tive-the "take-title provision"-rendered any state failing to meet the
final compliance deadline liable for all damages resulting from a failure
to take possession of the waste generated within its borders.99
The Court upheld the monetary and access incentives against constitu-
tional attack,1°° noting that its cases "have identified a variety of meth-
ods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to
adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.""' The
Court found the monetary and access incentives governed by two specifi-
cally approved methods: First, Congress may condition receipt of federal
finds.'" Second, Congress may offer the states the choice between reg-
ulating according to federal guidelines or having federal regulation pre-
empt inconsistent state law-so called "cooperative federalism. " " The
Court upheld the monetary incentives, although no federal funds were
expended under the Act,"°4 as proper under the conditional spending
95. See id. 149-54.
96. See id. at 144.
97. See id. at 152. "Sited" states-those where the waste would be
dumped--charged a fee to each state disposing of its waste. See id. Each sited state
collected the fee and transferred it to an account held by the U.S. Secretary of Ener-
gy. See id. As a compliance incentive, the Secretary would then make payments from
this account to those states attaining the first wave of compliance deadlines. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 171-73.
101. Id. at 166.
102. See id. at 166-67.
103. See id. at 167-68; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1983). Under cooperative federalism, states choose whether they
wish to act, or whether they wish to permit the federal government to act. See New
York, 505 U.S. at 167-68.
104. The Secretary of Energy made the timely compliance payments from a fund
generated solely by fees collected from disposing states by sited states. See supra
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power.'°5 The Court noted that it has never construed the spending
power to require a particular form of accounting.' 6 Similarly, the Court
upheld the access incentives as a valid exercise of "cooperative federal-
ism" despite the incentives' severe punishments of increased disposal
fees or the denial of disposal access altogether. '
The Court struck down the take-title provision, however, as beyond
the scope of federal power and as "crossing the line distinguishing en-
couragement from coercion."'0 " The Court described the "so-called in-
centive" as "offer[ing] States, as an alternative to regulating pursuant to
Congress's direction, the option of taking title to and possession of the
low level radioactive waste generated within their borders and becoming
liable for all damages ... suffer[ed] as a result of the States' failure to do
so promptly. ' '"a Thus, state governments could choose between accept-
ing ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress's commands
under the take-title provision."0 This choice was problematic, however,
because it did not permit the states to decide which government would
regulate; states could not decide whether the state or the federal govern-
ment would act."' Indeed, the take-title provision only provided states
with the choice of deciding how to regulate; either alternative required
the states to act."12 Moreover, while the access incentives' cooperative
note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the fee paid by states to the Secretary).
105. "[Tlhe Act informs the States exactly what they must do and by when they
must do it in order to obtain a share of the escrow account. The conditions imposed
are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure." New York, 505 U.S. at 172
(citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 173 ("States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste
according to federal standards by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency, or their
residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to federal regulation autho-
rizing sited States and regions to deny access to their disposal site."). Thus, because
Congress can regulate under its commerce power, it can offer a conditional exercise
of that power in the form of a choice to states to regulate according to federal com-
mands or to have state law preempted. Hence, the Court found the access incentives
to fall short of "outright coercion" because states retained the ability to determine
which regulatory method would be used: federal preemption or state regulation ac-
cording to federal guidelines. See id.
108. See id. at 174-76.
109. Id. at 174-75.
110. See id. at 175.
111. See id. at 175-76. States' ability to choose who will regulate is the principal
component of cooperative federalism. See id. at 168.
112. See id. at 176-77.
federalism was a proper conditional exercise of the commerce pow-
er,113 neither alternative under the take-title provision was within
Congress's authority."'
Thus, the Court found that a "choice between two unconstitutionally
coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. Either way, 'the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compel-
ling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program'-a method
clearly beyond Congress's constitutional authority."5 Moreover, the
Court found that although the Framers intended for Congress to have
substantial authority under the enumerated powers, the Framers did not
intend for Congress to have the ability to require the states to implement
Congress's regulations."' Indeed, the Court found that the Framers in-
tended the federal government's authority to extend directly over individ-
uals, not over the states."' As Madison and Hamilton explained, "[A]
sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments... as
contradistinguished from individuals; as it is a solecism in theory; so in
practice, it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity."" 8 Thus,
the Court found that Congress improperly commandeered the states into
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-77.
On one hand, the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to
transfer radioactive waste from generators to state governments. Such a
forced transfer . . .would in principle be no different than a congressionally
compelled subsidy from state[s] ... to radioactive waste producers. The
same is true of the provision requiring the States to become liable for the
generators' damages. Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable
from an Act of Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of cer-
tain state residents. Either type of federal action would 'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes. . . .On the oth-
er hand, the second alternative held out to state governments-regulating
pursuant to Congress' direction-would, standing alone, present a simple com-
mand to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress.
Id. at 175-76. Thus, according to the Court, whereas a proper scheme of cooperative
federalism contains one alternative where the federal government may regulate pursu-
ant to its enumerated powers, neither alternative under the take-title provision fell
within Congress's enumerated powers. See id. at 176-77.
115. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
116. See id. at 180. For a further discussion of whether the Framers intended for
the federal government to have the ability to commandeer state processes, see infra
notes 139-79 and accompanying text (discussing Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365 (1997)).
117. See id. at 180.
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 128-29 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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the service of the federal government by providing the states with a
choice between two coercive alternatives. Because some of Congress's
expenditure methods are often coercive, 9 the Court's decision in New
York is thus crucial to a discussion of the spending power because the
Court specifically denounced Congress's use of coercion.
2. United States v. Lopez: A Greater Indication of Restoring a Proper
Balance
In United States v. Lopez,121 the Supreme Court, for the first time in
nearly sixty years, 2 ' struck down a Congressional Act passed pursuant
to the Commerce Clause thus confining federal commerce power."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by stating the
established "first principles" of federalism which confine the federal
government to exercising only its enumerated powers." The Chief Jus-
tice proceeded to examine Commerce Clause precedent," finding that
although the Court's Depression era cases greatly expanded Congress's
power,'25 they had recognized some limit on federal power under the
Commerce Clause.'26
Rejecting the government's construction of how the Gun Free School
Zones Act (Act) met the third of the Court's three traditional Commerce
119. See infra notes 305-44 and accompanying text (discussing how the spending
power permits Congress to coerce state and local governments into adopting federal
regulations and guidelines).
120. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. For an in-
depth treatment of Lopez, see generally Hagen, supra note 37; Michael J. Trapp,
Note, A Small Step Towards Restoring the Balance of Federalism: A Limit to Feder-
al Power Under the Commerce Clause, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (1994).
121. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1911,
1911 (1995).
122. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. Lopez struck down the Gun Free School Zones
Act, which prohibited possession of firearms within 1000 feet of any school. See id.
at 551 & n.1.
123. See id. at 552. For the Lopez Court, a healthy federal-state balance is a corner-
stone principle of American government because a proper balance secures the bene-
fits of liberty by reducing the possibility for excessive accumulation of power in any
one government. See id.
124. See id. at 552-59.
125. See id. at 555-57 (citing Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937)).
126. See id. at 556-57.
Clause tests,127 the majority found that the Act extended beyond this
recognized limit.'28 Specifically, the Court characterized the
government's explanation as "pil[ing] inference upon inference" '29
which, if accepted, would permit Congress to legislate in virtually any
area under the auspices of the Commerce Clause or any other enumerat-
ed power.'30 Thus, the Court found that handguns near schools do not
substantially affect "commerce" 3' and that characterizing the Act in
this manner rendered the federal-state balance "illusory."'32 The Court
stated, "To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's
enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated,
and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local.'"" The Act in this way extended beyond the
limits of the Constitution."M Lopez is thus both relevant and important
to a discussion of the spending power because it indicates generally the
Court's willingness to enforce limits on broad federal powers.
127. See id. at 558-59. The Court has found three categories of activity that Con-
gress may regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause; the Court does not require that
Congress categorize or justify its Commerce Clause legislation at passage. See id. at
558, 562-63. The first two of the Court's three alternative Commerce Clause tests re-
quire either a showing of commerce crossing state lines or a showing of Congress's
own rational findings that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. See id.
The Lopez Court found that the Act could only be sustained, if at all, under the third
alternative test requiring that regulated activity substantially affect interstate com-
merce. See id.
128. See id. at 565-68. Specifically, in arguing to sustain the Act under the "substan-
tial effects" test, the government contended that firearm possession in a school zone
may result in violent crime and that violent crime may in turn affect the national
economy through "costs of crime" and decreased national productivity. See id. at 563.
First, the Government argued that because the costs of crime are substantial, in-
creased insurance costs are spread throughout the nation. See id. at 563-64. Second,
the Government argued that possession of firearms threatens the learning process and
in turn results in a less productive society, which adversely impacts the nation's eco-
nomic health. See id. In rejecting these justifications, the Chief Justice explained that
the Act "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise." Id. at 561.
129. Id. at 567.
130. See id. at 564.
131. See id. at 560-61.
132. See id. at 567-68.
133. Id. (citation omitted). In other words, if enumeration does not "presuppose
something not enumerated," then all legislative objects would fall within Congress's
authority, because the essential premise would be that the Constitution granted Con-
gress all possible powers and left to the States nothing. See id. at 567. The
Constitution's enumeration of powers, however, presumes that more powers exist
than merely those enumerated. See id. Otherwise, enumeration of powers makes little
sense. See id.
134. See id.
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Although New York and Lopez indicate a Court trend toward reviewing
Congressional legislation to ensure the constitutionally mandated federal-
state balance, the decisions nevertheless continue to leave some doubt as
to whether the Court may revisit the current view of the spending power.
While the Lopez Court had no occasion to review the spending pow-
er," the New York Court explicitly held that Congress may continue to
spend in furtherance of the general welfare by conditioning receipt of
federal funds upon states' implementation of federal objectives or oth-
erwise.13 Building upon New York and Lopez, the Court's most recent
decision in Printz v. United States'37 indicates that federalism is sub-
stantive in nature and that the Tenth Amendment, as the expositor of
federalism, is more than a "mere truism." Moreover, Printz does not rule
out the possibility that the Court may someday review the spending pow-
er under its federalism precedent."
3. Printz v. United States: The Court Refuses to Confine Principles of
Federalism Based on a Technicality
During the 1997 Term, and five years after deciding New York, the
Supreme Court again confronted the issue of Congress commandeering
the states. In Prntz,"' 9 the Court expounded its holding in New York
and held that the constitutional system of federalism prohibits Congress
from "conscripting the State's officers directly"4 ' in an attempt to avoid
135. Lopez involved only a Commerce Clause challenge to Congress's legislation. See
id. at 552.
136. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992).
137. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
138. See id. at 2376.
139. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. at 2368-84. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 2385-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas also fied a concurring opinion. See id. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined. See id. at 2386-401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also
filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 2401-04 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined. See id. at 2404-05
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Printz, see Lang Jin, Note, Printz v. Unit-
ed States: The Revival of Constitutional Federalism, 26 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999).
140. Id. at 2384. New York involved commandeering of state legislatures, not state
officers, as in Printz.
New York's prohibition on Congress compelling the "States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program.". The majority's approach in
Printz provides a useful tool with which to analyze existing and future
questions of federalism.
Printz involved a challenge to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act (Brady Act or Act)."' The Act was named after former White
House Press Secretary James Brady, who was shot during the assassina-
tion attempt on President Ronald Reagan. In an effort to regulate the sale
of handguns, the Brady Act, as enacted, required a firearms dealer to
obtain certain information from a prospective firearms purchaser, includ-
ing the purchaser's identity. The Brady Act required the dealer to provide
the state or local "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) with this infor-
mation." Unless the purchaser "possesse[d] a [proper] state handgun
permit" or "state law provide[d] for an instant background check," the
dealer had to "wait five business days before consummating the sale" of
the firearm."'
During this waiting period, the Act required the CLEO to conduct a
background check on the prospective handgun purchaser."' The CLEO
was required to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business
days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law,
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are
available and in a national system designated by the Attorney Gener-
al."14 The Act did not require the CLEO to "take any particular action"
if he determined that the prospective purchaser was ineligible.147 If the
CLEO notified the firearms dealer of the purchaser's ineligibility, howev-
er, the Act required the CLEO to "provide the would-be purchaser with a
written statement of the reasons for that determination [upon re-
quest]."1" Furthermore, upon a finding of eligibility, the Act required
the CLEO to destroy any and all documents he possessed relating to the
sale.' Jay Printz and Richard Mack, CLEOs in Montana and Arizona,
141. Id.
142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-930 (1994).
143. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(s)(1)(C) & (D)).
144. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)). The firearms dealer could proceed with
the sale earlier than five days if the CLEO "notifle[d] the dealer that he ha[d] no
reason to believe the transfer would be illegal." Id.
145. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)).
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respectively, challenged Congress's authority to enact these provi-
sions."o
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that Congress lacked the
power to "direct state law enforcement officers to participate, [even]...
temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory
scheme."' Examining "historical understanding and practice," "the
structure of the Constitution," and "the jurisprudence of [the] Court,"52
the majority invalidated the background check requirement and the im-
plicit requirement to accept the forms and information provided by the
firearms dealer." The Court let stand, however, the provisions requir-
ing CLEOs to destroy records related to the sale and provide ineligible
purchasers with a statement of the reasons for ineligibility. 4
First, Justice Scalia examined "historical understanding and prac-
tice." 5' Justice Scalia noted the importance of searching the practice of
the first Congresses, explaining that "early congressional enactments
'provid[e] "contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's
meaning."'"' Searching early United States history, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that "[n]ot only do the enactments of the early Congresses...
contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may
command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized
constitutional authorization, they contain some indication of precisely the
opposite assumption."57 Justice Scalia found that early congressional
acts "recommended" that state legislatures enact laws to further certain
congressional objectives instead of requiring the states' executives to
further the objectives." Thus, Justice Scalia noted "an absence of exec-
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 2370.
153. See id. at 2384.
154. See id. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to invalidate these two pro-
visions because the Court's invalidation of the background check requirement ren-
dered them moot. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (quoting Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983))). Justice Scalia explained that "if ... earlier
Congresses avoided use of" the power to commandeer state officials, "we would have
reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist." See id.
157. Id. at 2372.
158. See id. In one instance, Georgia refused to implement a recommendation. In
response, Congress did not command or require Georgia to act. See id. Instead, Con-
gress "authorized" but did not require state and local officials to implement the ob-
utive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses."'59 Addressing
the contentions of the United States, Justice Scalia then stated that
"there is an absence of [executive-commandeering statutes] in our later
history as well, at least until very recent years.""6 Significantly, Justice
Scalia noted that, until recently, even during wartime, the President re-
spected "state independence" and refrained from attempting to direct
state officials.'6
Justice Scalia next turned to the structure of the Constitution, in order
to "discern among its 'essential postulate[s]"' guidance on the issues
before the Court.62 Justice Scalia first announced the oft-cited and "in-
contestible" principle that "the Constitution established a system of 'dual
sovereignty.""' The majority reiterated that "although the States sur-
rendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government," the text
of the Constitution reflects the fundamental understanding that the states
nevertheless "retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.""' Per-
haps most importantly, "[r]esidual state sovereignty was ... implicit, of
course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all govern-
mental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.., which implication
was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment[]."'65 Moreover, "the
jective. See id.
159. Id. at 2375.
160. Id. The United States argued that the selective draft law during World War I
"authorized the President 'to utilize the service of any or all departments and any or
all officers or agents of the United States and of the several States . . .'" Id. (quoting
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 80-81). Justice Scalia responded twofold.
First, he noted that it is "far from clear" that the act authorized the President to
"compel the service of state officers." See id. Second, he noted that President Wilson,
in attempting to achieve the act, "requested the assistance of the States' governors"
instead of attempting to commandeer and direct them. See id. (noting that President
Wilson "call[ed] upon the Governor of each of the several States . . . and all officers
and agents of the several States . . . to perform certain duties," and that President
Wilson "requested" the governor of each State "to act under the regulations and rules
prescribed by the President").
161. See id.; see also supra note 158 (discussing Georgia's refusal to implement a
Congressional recommendation). Specifically, Justice Scalia proclaimed that "[iut is im-
pressive that even with respect to a wartime measure . . . President [Wilson] should
have been so solicitous of state independence." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
162. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
163. See id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt,
493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
164. See id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869), overruled
in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); Lane County v. Oregon, 74
U.S. (7 Wall) 71, 76 (1869), superseded by statute in Leitch v. Department of Reve-
nue, 9 Or. Tax 256 (1982)).
165. Id. at 2376-77 (citations omitted).
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Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States."166
The great innovation of this design was that "our citizens would have two polit-
ical capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other". . . The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will rep-
resent and remain accountable to its own citizens.... This separation of the two
spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty.'67
Thus, Justice Scalia proclaimed the substantive nature of federalism:
"'[T]he local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent por-
tions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres,
to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them....
' The majority explained that the structure of the Constitution, and
the Constitution's federalism, support the conclusion that the states are
entities separate and distinct from the federal government, and thereby
not subject to Congress's direction. Justice Scalia explained that the
federal government would grow immensely if Congress could press the
states into the service of the federal government at no cost to the nation-
al treasury.
169
Finally, Justice Scalia surveyed the Court's jurisprudence and deter-
mined that the Court has refused to permit the federal government to
conscript the states into attaining federal objectives.17 The majority
noted that, perhaps tellingly, "[flederal commandeering of state govern-
ments is such a novel phenomenon that this Court's first experience with
166. Id. at 2377 (emphasis added). As discussed below, the current interpretation of
the spending power effectively permits the federal government to "act upon and
through the States," especially when Congress conditions receipt of federal funds
upon states implementing federal objectives, especially federal objectives which are ei-
ther tangentially or wholly unrelated to the destination of the federal funds. See infra
notes 241-56 and accompanying text (discussing O'Connor's dissenting decision in
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
167. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 838 (1995)). For an in-depth analysis of U.S. Term Limits, see Julie Heintz,
Note, Why Can't a Chicken Vote for Colonel Sanders? U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton
and the Constitutionality of Term Limits, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 649 (1997).
168. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No 39, at 256 (James Mad-
ison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Further, "[ilt is an essential attribute of the States'
retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their prop-
er sphere of authority." Id. at 2381 (citing White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 725).
169. See id. at 2378; see also infra notes 351-53 (discussing the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act).
170. See id. at 2379-83.
it did not occur until the 1970's [sic], when the Environmental Protection
Agency promulgated regulations requiring States to prescribe auto emis-
sions testing, monitoring and retrofit programs, and to designate prefer-
ential bus and carpool lanes."171 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that the
United States government "declined" to defend these requirements after
the Court granted certiorari to review their constitutionality.72 Like-
wise, the majority cited several of its recent decisions supporting the
conclusion that the federal government may not direct states and state
officials.73 Justice Scalia rejected the United States' attempt to distin-
guish these cases, specifically, the United States' "untenable" position
that the Brady Act did not violate New York because it did not "diminish
the accountability of state or federal officials."74 In response, the ma-
jority asserted that
by forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving'
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs
of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the
blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.'75
Perhaps at least as important, Justice Scalia established that "[t]o say
that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all
of its officers, is to say nothing of significance. Indeed, it merits the de-
scription 'empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order"' which would
otherwise "disembowel" the holding in New York. Finally, the majori-
ty dismissed the government's proposed test for balancing important
policy objectives and purposes, a balancing test appropriately set forth in
previous Court decisions but on wholly different circumstances, by stat-
ing that "to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty,
such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate."'77
171. See id. at 2379.
172. See id. Instead, the government "rescinded some and conceded the invalidity of
those that remained." Id. at 2379-80.
173. See id. at 2380 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
174. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
175. Id. (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a For-
mula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1580 & n.65 (1994)). For example, under
the Brady Act, "it will be the CLEO and not some federal official who stands be-
tween the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be
the CLEO, not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error . . . that caus-
es a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected." Id.
176. See id. at 2382 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
177. See id. at 2383.
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In an apparent rebuke to the Depression era decisions expanding fed-
eral power, the majority opinion concluded by explaining that although
measures such as the Brady Act "'are typically the product of the era's
perceived necessity,"' the Constitution nevertheless "'divides power
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.""7
Having thus curbed Commerce Clause power and Congress's attempts
to commandeer state legislatures and state officials, the spending power
remains perhaps the broadest federal power upon which the Court has
yet to place any substantive limits.79 In order to predict whether the
Court may in the future circumscribe the federal spending power, an
understanding of the history and development of the current view of the
spending power is essential.
III. THE BASIS OF THE FEDERAL SPENDING POWER
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."' Over the
course of the nation's history, scholars have debated the scope and
meaning of this now-powerful clause. Early this century, the Supreme
Court sought to define the meaning of the Clause and has since expand-
ed upon its early interpretation.
178. See id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187); see also infra note 194 and ac-
companying text (discussing the importance of adhering to constitutional mandates
especially during times in which those constitutional mandates otherwise impede or
impair the swift and popular resolution of social or economic crises). Only a few
months before delivering the majority opinion in Printz, Justice Scalia commented
that "'[p]opular will' cannot overcome what the Constitution enshrines." Liberty &
Limits, supra note 2.
179. See infra note 414 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the
Court's interpretation of Congress's spending and commerce powers).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (commonly known as the Spending Clause, or
General Welfare Clause). Interestingly, during the period of ratification, Gouverneur
Morris attempted to insert a semicolon between "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises" and "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare" in order to change the meaning of the sentence. See FORREST
McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECULORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
264-65 (1985).
A. United States v. Butler: The Spending Power is Limited to
Furtherance of the General Welfare of the United States and Not to
Furtherance of the Enumerated Powers
In United States v. Butler, 1 the Supreme Court sought to articulate
the scope of, and provide an authoritative guide to, the Spending Clause
for the first time, finally resolving the debate that had raged between
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton more than a hundred years earli-
er.82 In doing so, however, the Court left some confusion regarding the
Clause's actual scope.
Butler involved a challenge to Congress's Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 (Act).1 " The Act increased farmers' prices for certain farm
products by decreasing the quantity harvested." To accomplish this,
Congress subsidized those farmers who agreed to produce less. 8 ' The
plaintiffs counsel asserted two principal theories for finding the Act
unconstitutional: First, the Act permitted Congress to tax and spend be-
yond the enumerated powers. Second, regulation of agriculture was not
within Congress's enumerated powers.
First, the Court formally rejected the proposition that the Constitution
limits Congress's spending to furthering an enumerated power." This
challenge resurrected the great debate between Madison and Hamilton
regarding the interpretation of the phrase "to provide for the ... general
Welfare."8 7 Madison argued that the Spending Clause encompassed on-
ly Congress's enumerated powers."s Madison believed that the "grant of
power to tax and spend for the general national welfare must be con-
fined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress. " '8
On the other hand, Hamilton urged that the Spending Clause conferred a
power separate and distinct from the enumerated powers.' 90 Hamilton
believed that Congress could tax and spend as long as such taxing and
spending promoted the general welfare of the nation.' The Court
adopted Hamilton's theory, believing that limiting the power to tax and
181. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
182. See id. at 65-66.
183. See id. at 53.
184. See id. at 53-55.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 65-66.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 65.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 65-66.
191. See id.
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spend only to the General Welfare Clause, and not to the subsequent
enumerated powers, was the most logical reading of the Clause.192
While, therefore, the power to tax [and spend] is not unlimited, its confines are
set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow and de-
fine the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress
to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by
the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.'93
After rejecting the spending power challenge and broadly defining
Congress's spending power, the Court, somewhat surprisingly, held that
the Act in question nevertheless violated the Tenth Amendment by plac-
ing within Congress's reach an impermissible end.9 4 Nearly relegating
its foregoing discussion of the spending power to mere dicta, the Court
stated,
We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase 'general welfare
of the United States' or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agricul-
192. See id. at 66.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 68. Thus, the actual holding of the case did not necessarily limit the
spending power to the general welfare, as opposed to the enumerated powers. In
order to achieve this result, the Court acknowledged the well-known truth that be-
cause "the United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those
not expressly granted, or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are
reserved to the states .... The same proposition, otherwise stated, is that powers
not granted are prohibited." Id. Because regulation of agricultural adjustment, produc-
tion, or the like was not an area within the powers conferred to Congress by the
Constitution, and because the effect of the Act's expenditures was to regulate agricul-
ture, the act violated the Constitution. See id. This result was specifically rejected
one year later in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-86 (1937), and
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937). The fact that these cases were decid-
ed in 1937 is likely evidence that the Court was attempting to preserve national pow-
er to deal with the great difficulties of the nation at the time or perhaps to preserve
itself and its members. Whatever the case, the economic exigencies accompanying
Steward Machine and Helvering cannot be ignored. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 786 n.16 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting); John Marshal Harlan,
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J.
943 (1963) (noting that times of "international unrest and domestic uncertainty" are
often "bound to produce temptations and pressures to depart from or temporize with
traditional constitutional precepts or even to short-cut the processes of change which
the Constitution establishes" and that lawyers and judges have a "special responsibili-
ty" to guard against this tendency).
ture falls within it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded
in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the [Act]."'
According to the Butler Court, regulation of agriculture was not within
any of Congress's enumerated powers, explicitly or otherwise." Thus,
although the spending power itself was not limited to furthering an enu-
merated power, the Butler Court held that Congress's regulations must
be supported by an enumerated power, and the effect of the Act was to
regulate agriculture, not to spend in its furtherance.197 Moreover, the
Court found that because the end of regulating agriculture was unconsti-
tutional, the means used-the spending power-to achieve the uncon-
stitutional end were likewise objectionable.98 Referencing McCulloch v.
Maryland," the Court found that "[t]he power [to tax and spend],
which is expressly granted, may, of course, be adopted as a means to
carry into operation another power also expressly granted."2" However,
to "resort to the ... power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate,
not within the scope of the Constitution, is obviously inadmissible." °1
It is significant that the Court would broadly construe the spending
power but nevertheless find that the ends of the federal expenditure
were improper. Finding that "[tihe power to confer or withhold unlimited
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy," 2 the Court continued by
observing that "[alt best [the Act] is a scheme for purchasing with feder-
al funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the
states."" 3 Accordingly, such a "scheme" was unconstitutional.2"
Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends
sought by the [Act]. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those
ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance. The Constitution and the
entire plan of our government negative any such use of the power to tax and to




195. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
196. See id.
197. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
198. See Butler, 297 U.S. 70-71.
199. 17 U.S. 316 (4 Wheat.) (1819). "Let the end be legitimate, let it be .within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421; see infra notes 292-308 and accompa-
nying text (discussing a means-ends analysis).
200. Butler, 297 U.S. at 69.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 72.
204. See id. at 61.
205. Id. at 74. Ironically, the Court currently holds that this result is proper. Indi-
rect regulation, unless specifically of the type prohibited in New York v. United
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Buttressing its position, the Court cited James Monroe, an advocate of
the broad Hamiltonian view of the spending power, as having proclaimed
that the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the power to tax
and spend for any purpose at "'their will and pleasure. ' ' 2° Thus, it is
apparent that even some Hamiltonians agreed that the Constitution inher-
ently commands limiting the spending power.27 Referring to the phrase
"provide for the general welfare," Hamilton himself noted that Congress's
purpose must be "'general, and not local.
' '1
2°
Thus, Butler establishes that Congress's spending is not limited to
furthering the enumerated powers; Congress can tax and spend to pro-
mote the general welfare of the nation. The Court found, however, that,
even assuming that the Act was within the general welfare, the Act was
impermissible under the Tenth Amendment because regulation of agri-
culture was not within the enumerated powers. During the following
term, the Court would find that the ends furthered by spending power
means need not originate in one of the explicit textual enumerated pow-
ers.
B. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and Helvering v. Davis: Congress May
Define the Scope of the General Welfare
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 2 and Helvering v. Davis,21 ° the
Court "specifically rejected" the Tenth Amendment result reached in
Butler"' and held that Congress may define the scope of the general
welfare."' The Court found that the ends sought to be furthered by
spending power means need not originate in an explicit enumerated pow-
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992), is well within Congress's power. See infra notes 320-
25 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's ability to indirectly regulate that
which it cannot directly regulate).
206. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66-67 (quoting from 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 167 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896)).
207. See id. at 77-78 (noting that even Hamilton would not have proposed that the
federal government have the ability to regulate local affairs).
208. See id. at 66-67 (quoting from 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on Manufacture,
in WORKS 250 (Lodge ed., 1904)); see supra note 58 (discussing the well-recognized
belief that Hamilton was the greatest expositor of federal power).
209. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
210. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
211. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 200 (5th ed.,
1995).
212. Id.
er.2"3 Steward Machine and Helvering both involved constitutional chal-
lenges to the then-recently enacted Social Security Act (Act).2"4 Steward
Machine held that the social security excise tax placed upon employers
of eight or more employees was constitutional.2"' Citing the nationwide
depression, the Court said, "It is too late today for the argument to be
heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of
the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for
any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare."2"'
The Court thus refused even to hear an assertion that Congress's taxing
and spending actions through the challenged Act were beyond the scope
of the general welfare.
Helvering involved a similar challenge to the social security tax de-
ducted from employees' wages. In a now-famous passage, Justice
Cardozo, writing for the majority, elucidated the reasoning in Steward
Machine.
The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and strongly
reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison.... Yet difficulties are left
when the power is conceded. The line must still be drawn between one welfare
and another, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be
known through a formula. ... There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra
in which discretion is at large. The discretion however, is not confided to the
courts. The discretion belongs to Congress... 27
Thus, the Court held that regardless of whether the Act was beyond
Congress's enumerated powers, the power to tax and spend was limited
only to promoting the general welfare-the scope of which Congress
could define-and not limited, as the Butler Court had found, by the
Tenth Amendment."8 "When money is spent to promote the general
welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress,
not the states."2"9
213. See id.
214. See Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 573-74; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 634.
215. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 573.
216. Id. at 586-87; see supra notes 178, 194 (discussing the danger of such a state-
ment).
217. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
218. See id. at 644-45; NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 200.
219. Id. at 645. Justice O'Connor perhaps best explained the limit of the Butler
decision in her dissent in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 217 (1986):
The error in Butler was not the Court's conclusion that the Act was essen-
tially regulatory, but rather its crabbed view of the extent of Congress' regu-
latory power under the Commerce Clause. The Agricultural Adjustment Act
was regulatory, but it was regulation that today would likely be considered
within Congress' commerce power.
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C. Berman v. Parker and Buckley v. Valeo: Congress Can Choose Any
Means It Desires in Furtherance of the General Welfare, and Such a
Determination May Not be Judicially Reviewable
The Supreme Court's view of the general welfare, and the extent to
which Congress may further the general welfare, is expansive. In
Helvering, the Court found that Congress retains the discretion to deter-
mine the general welfare.22 ° The Court has continued to maintain that
view and expanded upon it.
In Berman v. Parker,221 the Supreme Court held that Congress has
the authority under its power of eminent domain to condemn property
and then convey that property to private persons.2" Finding that "[t]he
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive,"2" the Court noted
that "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de-
clared in terms well-nigh conclusive."2" "In such cases, the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation."22 Thus, simply by passing a law, Congress de-
Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It must be remembered that Dole preceded the
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which announced
some limitation on Congress's commerce power. See supra notes 120-38 (discussing
Lopez). This Comment posits that a refusal to likewise confine the spending power
permits Congress to regulate-through the spending power-when Lopez might deny
the regulation under an enumerated power such as the Commerce Clause.
220. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
221. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
222. See id. at 33-35. The challenged Congressional act condemned certain parcels
in the District of Columbia and then conveyed those parcels to private developers, in
order to redevelop blighted areas. See id. at 28-31. Although this Comment does not
concern the power of eminent domain, nor Congress's authority over the District of
Columbia, Berman is an important case insofar as it further illustrates the Court's
expansive view of Congress's discretion in promoting the general welfare. Nor is it
necessarily significant that the act involved Congress's police power because the
Court nevertheless found that the act was passed to promote the public welfare. See
id. at 33. Berman is somewhat limited, however, in its application to this Comment.
Berman does not discuss the "general" welfare; Berman only elucidates the Court's
view of the concept of "welfare."
223. Id. at 33 (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952)).
Congress passed the act challenged in Berman to promote the welfare of both the
residents and the image of the seat of the national government. See id. at 28.
224. Id. at 32.
225. Id. "This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of emi-
nent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power
is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Id. (citing
clares the public welfare. This harkens to Madison's recognition that no
law passed by Congress is unrelated to furthering the public welfare"2
Thus, it would appear that if Congress writes the check, then the public
welfare has been furthered.
In Buckley v. Valeo,227 the Supreme Court addressed various challeng-
es to the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(Act).228 The challenge pertinent to this Comment involved federal fi-
nancing of presidential primary and general election campaigns and nom-
inating conventions.229 The Court rejected the claim that these federal
expenditures were contrary to the general welfare,2 0 noting that the
General Welfare Clause is "a grant of power, the scope of which is quite
expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause."231 Because Congress has the power to regu-
late presidential primaries and elections, 2 public financing of presiden-
tial elections is a means within that power.2 " "It is for Congress to de-
cide which expenditures will promote the general welfare. ."" The
Court explained that "Congress was legislating for the 'general
welfare'-to reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on
our political process .... "235 Moreover, "[w]hether the chosen means
appear 'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to us is irrelevant; Congress has
concluded that the means are 'necessary and proper' to promote the
general welfare .... "" Building on the Court's conception of the pub-
United States ex ret. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946); Old Do-
minion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
226. See infra notes 282-90 and accompanying text (discussing general welfare
spending in relation to enumerated powers).
227. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
228. See id. at 2.
229. See id. Specifically, the Act allocated public funds by establishing 3 categories:
First, the provision granted "major" parties-those whose candidates received at least
25% of the vote in the iunediately preceding presidential election-full matching
funds. See id. Second, the Act allocated to "minor" parties-those whose candidates
received at least 5% but less than 25% of the vote in the immediately preceding pres-
idential election-a certain smaller percentage. See id. Third, the Act granted "new"
parties a certain smaller percentage of post-election funds upon their respective can-
didates receiving at least 5% of the vote. See id. Additionally, a primary candidate,
under certain circumstances, was entitled to matching public funds. See id.
230. See id. at 90.
231. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819)).
232. See id. (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Burroughs v. Unit-
ed States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)).
233. See id.
234. Id. at 90-91 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)).
235. Id. at 91.
236. Id.
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lic welfare in Berman, and the Court's conception of the general welfare
in Helvering, the Buckley Court thus resolved that Congress is empow-
ered to determine the scope and meaning of the terms "general" and
"welfare" and that the determination might not be judicially
reviewable.237
D. South Dakota v. Dole: Congress Retains Broad Deference to
Condition States' Receipt of Federal Funds Upon Implementation of
Federal Regulations and Guidelines
Perhaps no type of federal expenditure under the spending power
affords Congress greater influence over states than the practice of condi-
tioning states' receipt of federal funds upon the implementation of feder-
al regulations and guidelines. The Supreme Court used the opportunity in
South Dakota v. Dole2" to synthesize its position on such conditions,
holding that conditioned federal funds as a rule are not repugnant to the
Constitution."u Finding that the spending power is "not -unlimited,"
however, the Court stated four general restrictions.24 ° First, the expen-
diture must further the general welfare.24' Thus, conditioned funds need
not be in furtherance of any enumerated power.242 Second, Congress
must condition funds "'unambiguously .. . , enabl[ing] the States to exer-
cise their choice knowingly."'2  Third, the conditions must be related to
the purpose or destination of the funds.2" Finally, other constitutional
provisions may act as an "independent bar" to funding conditions.245
237. See id.; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954); Helvering, 301
U.S. at 640 (1937).
238. 483 U.S., 203 (1987). In Dole, South Dakota challenged the granting of federal
funds for highway construction conditioned upon a state adopting a minimum drink-
ing age of 21. See id. at 205-06.
239. See id. at 206.
240. See id. at 207-08.
241. See id. at 207 (citing Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41 (1937); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). The Court noted that Congress is due substantial def-
erence in this area. See id. Buckley leaves doubt as to whether the Court would
interfere with such deference. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining
that the Court permits Congress to decide the scope and meaning of the general
welfare).
242. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
243. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981) (modifications in original)).
244. See id. at 207-08 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978)).
245. See id. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S.
A challenge based on the independent constitutional bar restriction
was the principal issue before the Court in Dole. Specific to the facts of
Dole, the Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment is not an inde-
pendent constitutional bar to conditional funding. 6 Examining earlier
cases, the Court likewise noted that it previously held that the Tenth
Amendment is not an independent bar to conditioned federal grants and
thus does not limit the extent of conditions Congress may place on fed-
eral funds.247 While recognizing that the independent constitutional bar
limitation is not "a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives
which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly,"" the Court also
noted that its decisions have acknowledged that in some cases, the "fi-
nancial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'2 4 9 Thus, the Court
recognized, as it had in Steward Machine and Butler, the potential for
coercion when the federal government pursues state implementation of
federal objectives by using conditional funding.25° Nevertheless, the
Court reaffirmed its statement in Steward Machine that "'to hold that
motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties.'
251
Justice O'Connor dissented,252 objecting not to the majority's princi-
ples and limitations but to the application of those limitations in the
instant case.5 3 Although agreeing that conditions must be reasonably
related to the purpose of the expenditure, Justice O'Connor would have
held that a minimum drinking age requirement as a condition to federal
funds was not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction."
Justice O'Connor was concerned primarily with permitting Congress to
condition funds based upon an "attenuated or tangential relationship" to
the destination of the funds. In her estimation, the majority's failure
256, 269-70 (1985)). The Court noted that the independent constitutional bar limitation
stands at least for the principle that the conditions cannot require a state to act in
violation of the Constitution. See id. at 210. Thus, a grant of funds conditioned upon
the state discriminating invidiously or promoting cruel and unusual punishment would
be an invalid use of the spending power. See id. at 210-11.
246. See id. at 212.
247. See id. at 210 (citing Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
248. See id.
249. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
250. See id.
251. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90). Perhaps our
entire system of jurisprudence might be more efficient and simple if we regularly ap-
plied an avoidance of "endless difficulties" standard.
252. See id. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. See id. at 212-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Gillmor & Eames, supra note
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to require a closer relationship between the conditions and the destina-
tion of the funds permitted Congress to "effectively regulate almost any
area of a State's social, political, or economic life."2" In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor adopted the view of the National Conference of State
Legislatures (National Conference), 7 which would limit Congress to
placing conditions only on how the federal funds are spent.2 8 Quoting
the National Conference's amicus brief, Justice O'Connor noted that
"Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose requirements on
a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent. A requirement
that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid
only if it falls within one of Congress' [sic] delegated regulatory powers.""'
Justice O'Connor explained that she would have returned to the Butler
Court's understanding of the spending power.Y That understanding
holds that Congress may use conditions to exercise its spending power,
not to exercise any regulatory authority.26 ' "'[T]here is an obvious dif-
ference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys
shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contrac-
tual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be
enforced."'26 The main concern with a broad conditional spending pow-
er is Congress's ability to use the spending power to regulate when Con-
71, at 399 (noting that federal state cooperation is strained and federal coercion pres-
ent when only a "tenuous relationship" exists between the conditions and the pur-
poses of the funding and citing as an example federal highway construction dollars
conditioned upon states' implementation of mandatory seat belt and motorcycle hel-
met laws).
256. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Amicus Brief for the National Conference
of State Legislatures et al., supra note 33, at 19-20).
260. See id. at 216-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained, howev-
er, that she believed the Court in Butler was misguided as to its understanding of
the Commerce Clause and that, under current Commerce Clause doctrine, regulation
of agriculture would likely come within the ambit of Congress's Commerce Clause
powers. See id. Thus, Justice O'Connor would not support the Butler position insofar
as it stood for the proposition that agriculture was beyond Congress's commerce
power. See id. at 217.
261. See id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936)); see also supra Part III.B. (discussing Butler).
262. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936)).
gress would not be permitted to regulate pursuant to one of its enumer-
ated powers such as the Commerce Clause.2" As the Butler Court not-
ed, had the Agricultural Adjustment Act in that case been a valid exer-
cise of Congressional authority, "evidently the regulation of all industry
throughout the United States [could] be accomplished by similar exercis-
es of the same power."" Congress's ability to "'tear down the barriers,
to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the
whole people"' 65 through use of a virtually unregulated spending power
"was not the Framers' plan and... is not the meaning of the Spending
Clause."2M Citing McCulloch v. Maryland,267 Justice O'Connor conclud-
ed by noting that "[t]he immense size and power of the Government of
the United States ought not obscure its fundamental character" as a gov-
ernment of enumerated and limited powers.2" Because no authority
delegated to Congress by the Constitution justified the conditional grant
of the federal funds in Dole, Justice O'Connor found the condition requir-
ing adoption of a minimum drinking age unconstitutional.269
E. Congress's Taxation Authority Under the Sixteenth Amendment
Guarantees that Congress Has Trillions of Dollars to Allocate
Congress has the ability to levy an income tax under the Sixteenth
Amendment, without any limits.27 Since that Amendment was ratified,
263. See id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Amicus Brief for the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, supra note 33, at 20.
All of this is not to say that the Court must invalidate a purported con-
dition on a grant that is found to be a regulation. As a regulation, the condi-
tion would be valid if it fell within one of Congress' delegated regulatory
powers. A test that inquires whether the federal requirement is a condition at
all, i.e., a specification as to the use of grant funds, rather than a regulation,
need not call into question any decision of this Court. It will merely ensure
that the decision in this case and others in the future will reflect the con-
stitutionally imposed limits on Congress' authority.
Amicus Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 33, at 20
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
264. Butler, 297 U.S. at 75.
265. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78
(1936)).
266. See id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
268. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 218 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
269. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 404-21 and accompany-
ing text (discussing a recent Fourth Circuit decision embracing Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Dole, Virginia Dep't of Ed. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), superseded by statute, as recognized by Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public
Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997)).
270. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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the federal government has collected trillions of dollars in revenue. Addi-
tionally, the national debt now exceeds five trillion dollars,27 ' which
confirms that not only has Congress spent all that it has assessed, but a
great deal more. With such tremendous leverage, Congress is indeed the
proverbial six hundred pound gorilla. This leverage is important in con-
sidering the spending power as related to the Tenth Amendment because
with such leverage Congress maintains the ability to coerce the states,
tempting them with precious resources.2"
F. The Supreme Court's Standing Requirements for Spending Power
Challenges are Onerous
In addition to the possibility that the scope and meaning of the general
welfare when defined by Congress may not be judicially reviewable,27
the Supreme Court's standing requirements for spending power challeng-
es are onerous and make it virtually impossible for federal taxpay-
ers-perhaps even states-to challenge federal spending. As a general
rule, federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge federal spend-
ing," although the Court has recognized one exception. In order to
have standing, a taxpayer-plaintiff must challenge a federal expenditure
both as a violation of the Article I spending power and as a violation of a
specific constitutional provision having the purpose of limiting federal
spending. 5 Alleged Establishment Clause violations satisfy the second
271. See Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 26.
272. See infra notes 319-60 (discussing the oft-coercive nature of conditioned federal
funds).
273. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
274. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). The argument appears
to be that the causal link between the federal spending and the taxpayers' injury
(e.g., higher taxes) is generally uncertain. Moreover, governmental units may not have
standing to challenge federal spending. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood
County, 302 U.S. 485, 490 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79
(1938).
275. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968). The Flast Court also said, "It
will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the admin-
istration of an essentially regulatory statute." Id. at 102 (emphasis added). This state-
ment would appear to presume that Congress enacted the "essentially regulatory stat-
ute" pursuant to one of its "enumerated" powers other than the Spending Clause of
the General Welfare Clause. If Justice O'Connor, in Dole, is correct that United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), prohibits Congress from using the Spending Clause and
its conditional spending power to regulate in place of an enumerated power, then it
would appear, at least facially, that the F/ast Court's statement would not necessarily
requirement;"6 however, the Court has rejected other possible claus-
es,277 thereby effectively limiting the taxpayer's ability to challenge fed-
eral spending to Establishment Clause cases.27 Because federal taxpay-
ers do have standing to challenge federal taxes, however, it is at least
conceivable, albeit unlikely, that a federal taxpayer could challenge feder-
al spending that is closely related to a federal taxation scheme. Notwith-
standing this theoretical possibility, the practical impact of the Court's
standing requirements bars a plaintiff from challenging federal spending.
George Wharton Pepper, in his oral argument in United States v. But-
ler,279 prophesied the danger of an extensive interpretation of the
spending power when coupled with limited standing to challenge Con-
gressional spending:
[I]f the spending power is ever thus deliberately invoked to enlarge the area of
Congressional control, it might not be impertinent to ask this Court to consider
whether, in a democracy, the individual citizen has not a standing to call the legis-
prohibit federal taxpayers from challenging a federal spending program which is itself
directly-and not merely incidentally-regulatory. See supra notes 252-69 and accom-
panying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole, and her belief that the
Court should read the Constitution as prohibiting Congress from using the spending
power to regulate beyond its enumerated powers); see also supra notes 194-208 and
accompanying text (discussing the Butler Court's holding that Congress may not use
the spending power to regulate beyond its enumerated powers).
276. See id.; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (reaffirming that
taxpayers have standing to challenge federal statutes authorizing expenditures alleg-
edly violating the Establishment Clause).
277. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 476-82 (1982) (holding that the conveyance of federal
property to a Christian college did not violate the Establishment Clause and thus did
not violate the spending power because such a conveyance is not an expenditure but
rather a disposal of federal property under Congress's property power, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
216-27 (1974) (holding that taxpayers had no standing to challenge Members of
Congress's membership in the armed forces reserve under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.
2 which prohibits Members of Congress from holding "any office under the United
States"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-80 (1974) (holding that taxpay-
ers lacked standing to challenge the statute appropriating funds for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency on the ground that such appropriation violated U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 7, which requires "a regular statement and account of the receipts and expendi-
tures").
278. See DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 689 n.19 (11th Cir.
1997) ("[W]ith respect to federal taxpayers, the Supreme Court has generally found
they lack standing to contest government spending unless the challenge is to govern-
ment expenditures which allegedly violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.") (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 83). Concededly, Schrenko involved a chal-
lenge to state expenditures. See id. at 689-90. However, Flast involved federal expen-
ditures. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
279. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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lature to account, not because of his pecuniary stake but because of his responsi-
ble share in government.2"
Alas, the Court has all but disregarded Pepper's plea, and federal spend-
ing is virtually insulated from review.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS INDICATE THE NEED TO REASSESS THE
CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE SPENDING POWER
The current interpretation of the federal spending power has resulted
in serious constitutional ramifications. The concept of enumerated pow-
ers and protections of state sovereignty is rendered illusory. The
majority's approach in Printz v. United States" provides a useful tool
toward analyzing the spending power implications for federalism.
A. The Virtually Limitless Interpretation of the Federal Spending
Power has Resulted in Serious Constitutional Ramifications
1. The Concept of Enumeration is Illusory
In the Virginia Report of 1800, Madison expressed his view that permit-
ting Congress to spend to further the general welfare effectively empow-
ered Congress to legislate generally.2 Madison observed that virtually
every legislative action involves the "application of money" and, more-
over, that no act of Congress is unrelated to furthering the general wel-
fare.2" Thus, Madison concluded that "a government with the power to
spend for any purpose coming within the notion of the general welfare
'is a government without the limitations formed by a particular enumera-
tion of powers."'284
280. Id. at 37 (oral argument of George Wharton Pepper for the respondents).
281. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); see supra notes 139-79 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Printz).
282. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of '98: An Essay in Historical Retriev-
al, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 729 n:159 (1994). By "legislate generally," Madison meant that
Congress would be empowered to legislate purely state and local matters. See id.
283. See id.; see also 4 CONG. DEB. 1632 (1828) ("[I]f Congress can determine what
constitutes the general welfare, and can appropriate money for its advent, where is
the limitation to carrying into execution whatever can be effected by money?").
284. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 651, 662, 664 (1995).
The Constitution, however, forbids Congress from legislating generally.
The federal government is one of enumerated powers," and enumera-
tion presupposes that powers have been withheld." The powers with-
held-those not enumerated-are reserved to the States.287 Federalism
embodies this allocation of state and federal authority,' and federal-
ism presumes principally that the federal government is limited in its
authority.289 It follows that if Congress is limited in its authority, then,
consistent with the Constitution, Congress may not legislate generally.
With the decision in United States v. Butler," however, the Court
unwittingly began a path of effectively permitting Congress to legislate
generally, by permitting Congress to spend in order to further the general
welfare. In McCulloch v. Maryland,29' Chief Justice Marshall pro-
claimed, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the con-
stitution, and all means which... consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional .. .,,2" In the normal constitutional
challenge regarding an enumerated power, therefore, the Court reviews
congressional legislation with varying degrees of scrutiny" to ensure
285. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
286. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)). Were it otherwise, one might be inclined to
wonder why the Framers would specify Congress's powers had they intended
Congress's powers to be unlimited. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (citing 3 STo-
RY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 37, at 752).
287. See New York, 505 U.S at 156 (citing United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,
648-49 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941)) (finding that "[If a power is an at-
tribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress"). Because Congress is limited
to its enumerated powers, states have historically reserved authority over education,
criminal law enforcement, and local police power matters. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561
n.3, 564. See generally Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the Unsteady Path: United
States v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 99, 130-31 (1995) (noting other areas traditionally reserved to the states such
as highway and street construction and repair, welfare, housing, health, recreation,
and waste disposal).
288. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155-56.
289. See id. Likewise, the states are limited in their operation insofar as they may
not intrude upon the powers granted to Congress. Se" id. at 159. The Supremacy
Clause embodies this principle that Congress is supreme and may trump inconsistent
state law where Congress has the proper authority to act. See id. (citing U.S. CONST.
art. VI., cl. 2).
290. 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text (discussing
Butler).
291. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
292. Id. at 421. (emphasis added).
293. See Roger Pilon, A Court Without a Compass, 40 N.Y.L. SCe. L. REv. 999, 1006-
07 (1996).
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that the legislation is both proper in its end and in its means.99 That is,
the Court normally examines whether the Constitution grants the end to
Congress, and, if so, whether the means are necessary and proper to
effectuate that end.295
Under the Court's decisions, however, spending power review is funda-
mentally different from review of other enumerated powers. The spend-
ing power itself is a means to an end, and the end is the general wel-
fare." This end is legitimate under virtually all circumstances because
the Court permits Congress to define the scope and meaning of the gen-
eral welfare.29 Thus, when Congress spends, the end for which the
spending is appropriated remains unquestioned, and the Court presumes
"well-nigh conclusive[ly]" that the end promotes the general welfare.298
In this way, the ends are unlimited.
Similarly, the means-the power to spend-is virtually unlimited for
two reasons. First, unless the expenditure can be challenged as a regula-
tion, standing rules may preclude a plaintiff from even challenging an
expenditure in a particular case, thus insulating federal spending from
judicial review. Second, when a court actually reviews the spending
power in a particular case, the act involving the application of money
will be upheld except in a few narrow circumstances." ° Thus, the
294. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421; see also Pilon, supra note 293, at
1007-08 (explaining that "[ulnder the Constitution as written ... [o]ne asked first
whether a power had been granted. If not, that ended the matter. If yes, the next
question was whether the means employed, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
were both necessary and proper. If not necessary, that too ended the matter").
295. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421; Pilon, supra note 293, at 1007-08. Pilon,
however, argues that the modem methodology for reviewing constitutional questions
is fundamentally different than the methodology under the original understanding of
the Constitution. See id. at 1007. Thus, he argues that the concept of varying degrees
of scrutiny is at odds with the text of the Constitution. See id.
296. This necessarily assumes that the expenditure is not designed to further one of
the enumerated powers. This Comment does not challenge the constitutionality or
efficacy of Congress's expenditures in that instance.
297. See supra notes 200-17 and accompanying text (discussing Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), and
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
298. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see also supra notes 218-28 and accompanying
text (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
299. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text (discussing the onerous standing
requirements which may insulate spending from review).
300. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (synthesizing the
Court's four narrow restrictions on conditioned federal funds).
Court effectively permits Congress to use spending power means to
achieve any desired ends.3"' Such a view appears to contravene the un-
derstanding of many Framers and early legislators "'[tihat the common
defence and general welfare, were the ends proposed to be attained-the
enumerated powers which followed, were the means of attaining them;
and that money was the instrument, as far as it was necessary, by which
those powers were to be executed."'3 2
Although a means-ends comparison is important, Madison observed
that "it must be wholly immaterial, whether unlimited powers be exer-
cised under the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the
name of unlimited means of carrying into execution, limited powers. " 3°
For Madison, the ability to legislate either by unlimited powers or by
unlimited means granted Congress the ability to legislate generally, that
is, beyond the confines of the enumerated powers.' Madison was
therefore concerned with confining both the means and the ends to the
powers enumerated in the Constitution in order to maintain enumera-
tion's limits on federal power."5 Madisonians were especially con-
301. For example, the spending of federal money in pursuit of what Congress has
determined to be the general welfare has evolved to include "virtually every aspect of
state and local government operations" ranging from highway and street construction
and repair, welfare, housing, health, education, law enforcement, recreation, to waste
disposal. See Ching, supra note 287, at 130-31. Additionally, in early 1997, President
Clinton proposed a $1500 college tuition tax credit for students who maintain at least
a B average. See Cimons & Shogren, supra note 87, at Al. The concern, however, is
how the federal government and the Internal Revenue Service should police such
requirements, and whether the federal government or IRS might require state or uni-
versity officials to do so. See id. Likewise, a few days after presenting the Hope
Scholarship, President Clinton proposed national educational testing standards. See
Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton Promotes Education Initiative for National Testing, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1997, at A30. In making his case, the President analogized primary
education to the army, suggesting "how silly it would be" to have different standards
for troops in different states. See id. at A31. However, because education is a state,
not a federal, function, one wonders how these two education proposals will be car-
ried into effect. See id. at A30-31; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
(1995). The Court's current spending power doctrine leaves little doubt that the feder-
al government could condition education dollars upon states' implementation of the
programs. See infra note 397 and accompanying text (discussing President Clinton's
proposal to condition federal education funds on states' implementation of the Gun
Free School Zone Act as a method for subverting the Court's decision in Lopez).
302. See Brief filed by Malcolm Donald as anicus curiae on behalf of the National
Association of Cotton Manufacturers at 154, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(No. 401) [hereinafter Manufacturers' Brie] (quoting Mr. Smyth of Virginia), in 30
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 846
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
303. Powell, supra note 284, at 663 n.58.
304. See generally id.
305. See generally id.
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cerned with the courts' inability to review effectively cases involving
questions of the general welfare, and thus proclaimed the dangers of a
broad interpretation of the general welfare as permitting unlimited ends
or, apparently unlimited means."6 Observing that the Framers intended
the General Welfare Clause to limit federal power by confining federal
activities to those national and not truly local in character, one scholar
has suggested that by "eviscerating the doctrine of enumerated powers,
the Court [has] turned shields into swords.""7
Recognizing the importance of enumeration, it is probable that the
early Congresses avoided using the spending power, as it is now used, to
direct states to implement federal objectives. Even assuming that early
Congresses adopted the Hamiltonian view of the spending power-an
assumption which is by no means conclusive-the great expositor of
federal power, Hamilton himself, acknowledged that the Constitution
limits federal spending."8
"And there seems to be no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the gener-
al interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufacturers, and of commerce, are
within the sphere of national councils, as far as regards an application of mon-
ey... A power to appropriate money with this latitude, which is granted, too, in
express terms, would not carry a power to do any other thing not authorized in
the Constitution, either expressly or by a fair implication."'
And it was Hamilton who claimed that Congress's objectives must be
"general, and not local" in nature.310 James Monroe, an adherent to the
Hamiltonian view, believed that "'the use or application of the money
after it is raised is a power altogether of a different character. It imposes
no burden on the people, nor can it act on them in a sense to take pow-
er from the States[]."'3"
306. See id.; see also supra notes 238-80 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
review, or the lack thereof, in spending power cases).
307. See Pilon, supra note 293, at 1005. Pilon also suggests that the Court's New
Deal and Depression era jurisprudence commenced "'nothing less than a bloodless
constitutional revolution."' Id. at 1006 (quoting Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994)).
308. See Manufacturers' Brief, supra note 302, at 165, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 302, at 857.
309. Id. at 165-66 (quoting 3 HAMILTON, Report on Manufacture, in WORKS, supra
note 208, at 372).
310. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
311. See Manufacturers' Brief, supra note 303, at 168 (quoting James Madison), in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 302, at 860.
One would expect the Hamiltonians, of any group, to proclaim that the
spending power grants Congress the ability to regulate within areas re-
served to the states. However, at least as expressed by Hamilton and
Monroe, that is not the case. Early presidential messages and congressio-
nal debates on those messages underscore what these Hamiltonians and
Madisonians appear to have recognized the spending power denies to
Congress any ability to regulate matters reserved to the province of the
states.12 Moreover, a survey of early congressional legislation reveals
that while early Congresses typically appropriated funds for affairs be-
yond the enumerated powers, such appropriations were not necessarily
designed to interfere with the authority of the states.' 3 Finally, it is un-
surprising that Hamiltonians expressed an unlimited view of the spending
power. The "Hamiltonian view" of the spending power, as it is modernly
known,314 failed to garner serious support until nearly thirty years after
the Constitution was ratified in 1789 and was not first exercised until
1825."' As Justice Scalia indicated in Printz v. United States,"6 if ear-
312. See id. at 148-58 (discussing appropriations for roads and canals for the period
up to the Civil War), in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 302, at 839-50.
313. See id. at 180-84, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 302, at 872-76.
314. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Butler Court's
analysis of the distinction between Madison's and Hamilton's view of the welfare
clause).
315. See id. at 156 (quoting James Polk, Veto Message (Dec. 15, 1847), in 4 MES-
SAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 610, 618-20 (1897)), in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 302, at 848. This Comment does not address the propriety of the Court's adop-
tion in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936), of the Hamiltonian view of the
spending power. That view is now entrenched in our jurisprudence. This Comment
does suggest, however, that such a broad interpretation allows Congress to subvert
the federal-state balance. The Court should seriously consider Congress's ability to
coerce the states into the service of the federal government through spending condi-
tions. Indeed, the Court disavows Congress's ability to commandeer the states
through direct regulation; just as the Court is willing to close the front door of regu-
lation, so too should the Court close the back door of regulation through the spend-
ing power. See infra note 415 and accompanying text (discussing the apparent futility
of confining regulation and refusing to confine the spending power). Although the
Hamiltonian view of the spending power may have failed to gain serious support
until well into the nineteenth century, it is not altogether clear that early Congresses
and presidents completely confined federal spending to' the enumerated powers. "[I]t
was seriously contended as late as 1817 that Congress had adopted the Hamiltonian
Doctrine by appropriating money for the payment of the salary of the Senate Chap-
lain, for the purchase of books for the library at Congress and paintings for the Cap-
itol," all of which Congress apparently lacked the enumerated power to implement.
See Manufacturers' Brief, supra note 302, at 135, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
302, at 827. Thus, some Members of Congress contended that early Congresses' ap-
propriation of money for a library, a chaplain, and artwork justified and permitted
Congress to appropriate money to construct such things as roads and canals for the
purpose of carrying malls (a federal power), for the military (a federal power), and
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ly public officials sought to avoid the use of a particular "highly attrac-
tive" power, then it would suggest that they did not understand the Con-
stitution to permit such a use."7
2. The Current Interpretation of the Spending Power Permits Congress
to Coerce State and Local Governments into Adopting Federal
Regulations and Guidelines
In addition to permitting Congress to promote unenumerated ends, the
Court's view of the spending power might also be assailed on the ground
that it permits Congress to promote both enumerated and unenumerated
ends through illegitimate means such as federal coercion, regulation, and
commandeering of the states. This coercion is accentuated when the
Court permits Congress to place wholly unrelated conditions on states'
receipt of funds. In 1997, one Fourth Circuit judge observed that "[this is]
a time when the several States have become increasingly dependent upon
the Federal Government for funds, because the Federal Government has
increasingly become dependent upon revenues from taxation it receives
from the citizens of the several States.""8
Although the Court explicitly acknowledges that such illegitimate
means are inappropriate when Congress legislates pursuant to a specifi-
cally enumerated power,"9 the current interpretation of the spending
power empowers Congress to coerce, regulate, and commandeer the
states.' In addition to presuming that conditioned federal funds are
to regulate commerce. See id. at 151-53, in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 302, at 843-
45.
316. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
317. See id. at 2370; see also supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text (discussing
the historical underpinnings of Printz, and the lack of historical support for federal
commandeering of state legislative and executive officials).
318. Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 570 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
superseded by statute, as recognized by Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public Safety &
Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997).
319. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), for example, the Court
found that while assuming, arguendo, that regulation of low-level radioactive waste
was within Congress's Commerce Power, neither of the two choices given the states
in the take-title provision were within the Commerce Power. See id. at 174-76; see
also supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing New York).
320. This Comment suggests below that the spending power should not necessarily
be viewed as a separate and distinct enumerated power, but rather a power with the
purpose of carrying into effect the particular enumerated powers. This Comment
not coercive,32 the Court strongly implies that Congress may indirectly
coerce state and local governments into adopting federal regulations or
guidelines by using the spending power, although Congress would not be
permitted constitutionally to do so directly by using any enumerated
power. Coercion, it would appear, is immaterial in current spending pow-
er cases.322 The Court permits Congress, through the Spending Clause
power, to extend beyond the enumerated powers and regulate areas re-
served traditionally to the jurisdiction of state and local governments
exclusively.323 This result renders the Tenth Amendment, although per-
haps theoretically significant, meaningless in practice.324
Thus, although cases such as Butler, New York, and Printz invoke the
Tenth Amendment to curb federal coercion of state or local govern-
suggests that, at the least, the Court narrow Congress's ability to condition federal
funds and eliminate Congress's ability to regulate state and local matters by using
conditional funding.
321. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937) (noting that
"to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties").
322. By contrast, in New York, the Court held that the take-title provision, a provi-
sion not passed pursuant to the spending power, crossed the line between encour-
agement and coercion and was thus invalid. See New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
323. See Ching, supra note 287, at 141. Thus, Congress is permitted, under its
Spending Clause power, to extend beyond the limits of the enumerated powers. See
id. Through use of conditional grants, "Congress has mandated states' compliance
with its conditions in areas far removed from its enumerated powers." See id.;
Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 274-84 (1969) (holding that local authority
managing federally assisted housing project must abide by federal Housing and Urban
Development procedures); see also Manufacturers' Brief, supra note 302, at 135 (dis-
cussing Congress's ability to interfere with areas reserved to the states), in LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 302, at 848.
324. See generally Ching, supra note 287, at 141.
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ments,325 the Court currently views the spending power to be free from
such restraint. 6
Whether direct or indirect, coercion is nevertheless troublesome and
seems to contradict the essential holdings of New York and Printz that
Congress may not, consistent with the Constitution, commandeer states
into the service of the federal government.27 The take-title provision in
New York violated this rule by offering states a choice between only two
coercive alternatives."s Therefore, a principal issue was the extent to
which states retained the ability to accept or reject Congress's com-
mands. 9 The Court invalidated the act in New York on the basis that
the take-title provision failed to provide states with a real "choice" be-
tween regulating pursuant to Congress's design, or having Congress pre-
empt the field." ° For the New York majority, the take-title provision
provided the states with "no choice at all.'' " Congress's command in
Printz left the states (and state law enforcement officers) with no choice
but to implement the federal directive.2
325. In Butler, the Court declared that "[t]he power to confer or withhold unlimited
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71
(1936). The Butler Court held the challenged act unconstitutional on the ground that
it permitted Congress to purchase state submission to federal regulations. See id. at
72. In fact, in Butler, the Court explicitly held that Congress may not achieve its
ends indirectly through the spending power, finding that the Constitution "negatives"
any such use. See id. at 74; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Agricultural Adjustment Act's unconstitutional indirect regulation). In New
York, the Court found that cooperative federalism requires the States to have a
choice between implementing federal regulations themselves or having Congress pre-
empt the field. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68. Thus, Congress may not require
that the states implement federal regulations without providing states with the choice
of having the field preempted. See id. at 176-77. In this way, state implementation of
federal regulations is deemed more voluntary, whereas without this choice, such im-
plementation is an involuntary commandeering. See id.
326. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 971 (1985).
327. See supra notes 93-119, 139-79 and accompanying text (discussing New York
and Printz).
328. See New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
329. See id. at 176-77.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 176.
332. At most, Congress could have argued in Printz that state legislatures could
circumvent the federal directive by enacting instant state background checks consis-
tent with the Brady Act, thus exempting the CLEOs from the federal directive. The
Court could not have accepted such an argument, however, without flatly rejecting its
holding in New York. A choice between implementing a federal directive or enacting
Similarly, states may have little or no choice but to accept federal
funds." The practical effect of combining the tremendous resources at
Congress's command" with the often limited resources available to
state and local governments is to permit Congress to offer moneys which
often cannot be refused. 5 When states become dependent upon federal
grants, conditions attached to such grants are indeed coercive because
the states cannot survive without the federal funds and must accept the
conditions.3" For example, in order to carry out federal objectives, the
federal government provides state and local governments with approxi-
mately $226 billion annually, which amounts to sixteen percent of the
total state and local government expenditures. 37 The choice to accept
or reject, therefore, is frequently illusory,' much like the "choice" pre-
sented to the states in New York. Likewise, coercion is evident when the
a state law consistent with the federal statute is no more a choice than that present-
ed to the states in New York because either alternative requires the states, or state
officers, to act. New York and Printz make clear that the Court soundly repudiates
Congress directing and requiring state legislatures, or state officers, to act. See supra
notes 93-119, 139-79.
333. See Stewart, supra note 325, at 971. Naturally, a widely asserted rebuttal to
the argument that Congress uses its financial clout to coerce and commandeer states
is that states hre free to deny federal funds. See id. (noting that federal courts have
struck down spending power challenges on this basis). This choice may exist in theo-
ry. See Ching, supra note 287, at 132. This Comment does not challenge the idea that
states have every opportunity, again, in theory, to reject federal funding.
334. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's taxing
and spending abilities).
335. See Stewart, supra note 325, at 971. States are under tremendous pressure to
accept federal dollars. See id. This is due in part to internal pressures from citizens
and in part to external pressures arising from competition with other states. See id.;
see also Ching, supra note 287, at 131-32. States refusing federal money place them-
selves at an economic disadvantage vis-A-vis the other states. See Stewart, supra note
325, at 971. This refusal could require a state to increase state taxes or reduce bene-
fits to its citizens. See id. Likewise, the state citizens who contribute to federal cof-
fers through their tax dollars would receive less in benefits in return for their con-
tribution. See id. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, as federal funds become
increasingly available for state and local ventures, states become more dependent on
such funds and increasingly unable to reject continued federal assistance. See id.
Therefore, states become dependent upon federal grants as a result of a cycle of
continued funding and as a matter of survival among the other states. See Gilmor &
Eames, supra note 71, at 399. States rely upon continued federal aid after establish-
ing programs to avoid "wasted efforts at half-finished projects." See id. Moreover,
most state and local officials would give a "blank stare" to anyone asking them how
some essential projects, such as highway and bridge maintenance, would be funded
without federal aid. See id.
336. See Stewart, supra note 325, at 971.
337. See Patricia E. Salkin, National Performance Review: A Renewed Commitment
to Strengthening the Intergovernmental Partnership, 26 URB. LAw. 51, 53 (1994).
338. See Ching, supra note 287, at 132.
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federal conditions are disproportionate to the aid received by the state or
local governments.' Moreover, Congress often intends to "conscript
state and local governmental authority in carrying out federal programs"
by using conditional funding schemes."4° There may be no clearer ex-
ample of coercion. 1
Federal coercion of states should be eliminated for at least four rea-
sons. First, coercion tends to encourage divisiveness. 2 Second, the ac-
countability of both federal and state officials is diminished when the
federal government coerces or compels the states to regulate. 3 Third,
as the Court emphasized in New York, coercion is repugnant to the
Constitution's prescription that the federal government legislate over
individuals, not over sovereign states.' Citing a myriad of cases,"
339. Gillmor & Eames, supra note 71, at 399 (citing, as examples, provisions of
both the federal Clean Air Act and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991).
340. See Stewart, supra note 325, at 971.
341. See Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions:
Federalism and Individual Rights, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 460, 464-65 (1995)
(noting that Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), provides the clearest
example of federal coercion of states pursuant to the spending power); see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (implicitly acknowledging that
Congress's use of the spending power is or can be coercive, but noting that the stat-
ute before the Court was not necessarily coercive because "Congress has not held
out the threat of exercising it's spending power" (emphasis added)); Richard E. Levy,
New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, Histo-
ry, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493,
520-21 (1993) (noting that the federal government uses conditional grants "to procure
state implementation of significant federal regulatory programs"); Stewart, supra note
325, at 971 (noting that conditional grants are "far more subversive of federalism
values" than even some direct federal regulations of state governments).
342. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,
1048 (1995); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 164-65.
343. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
344. See id. at 165. Many "scholars have debated whether in fact the Framers in-
tended or contemplated the possibility that Congress could commandeer-that is leg-
islate over-the states as sovereign entities. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 343, at
1042-50; Powell, supra note 11, at 660-64. Although more scholars appear to endorse
the notion that the Framers contemplated Congress commandeering the state execu-
tive and judicial branches, they are perhaps more willing to acknowledge that the
Framers may have rejected the notion that Congress could commandeer state legisla-
tures. See Caminker, supra note 342, at 1048; Powell, supra note 11, at 660-64. Re-
gardless, the Court in New York explicitly found that the Constitution permits Con-
gress to legislate over individuals, not states and, moreover, that Congressional com-
Justice O'Connor indicated in New York that the Court has "always un-
derstood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitu-
tion to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
to directly compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.""6
Fourth, and most importantly, when states are required to act by the fed-
eral government, state and local officials must divert resources away
from local concerns.4 7 Moreover, when spending conditions require
state and local governments to act, those governments accepting funds
mandeering of states is repugnant to the Constitution. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
345. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1983);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), superseded by statute in Leitch v.
Department of Revenue, 9 Or. Tax 256 (1982)).
346. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. For example, the Constitution "authorizes Congress
to regulate interstate conmmerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate
state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." Id. Some scholars argue that
direct federal legislation is a greater threat to state sovereignty than the state's imple-
mentation of federal programs attached through conditions on federal funds. See Levy,
supra note 341, at 524. The idea is that the states maintain some control over im-
plementation of the programs affecting their locality. See id. Hamilton and Madison,
however, clearly contemplated a system of government whereby the citizens would
allocate their "favor" toward either the federal or state governments when necessary.
See THE FEDERAUST No. 46, at 317 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). As
discussed above, in order for this to work, the citizens must have some means of
knowing to whom to allocate their favor. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying
text (discussing the importance of political responsibility and accountability, and how
this responsibility and accountability become blurred when federal officials are per-
mitted to unfairly take advantage of the balance of power already skewed in favor of
the federal government). A properly balanced federalism helps to ensure that citizens
know who to hold politically accountable by helping to keep lines of accountability
from being blurred by either the state or federal governments. Therefore, by regulat-
ing Congress's ability to condition funds more stringently so as to prohibit Congress
from "passing the buck" to the states, a properly balanced federalism should in theo-
ry permit the citizens to allocate their favor accordingly. If citizens desire that the
federal government legislate directly, pursuant to a federal power, and within the
federal sphere of authority, so be it. An effective choice, however, is impossible un-
less the citizens know which government to hold accountable and which government
to direct.
347. See Gillmor & Eames, supra note 71, at 398 (noting that federal spending con-
ditions "displace local programs already carefully crafted to fit the specific local
need") (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543, 545 (1954) (explaining that Congress's views are shaped by national, not
local concerns, and as such, congressional directives may aim to solve problems not
present in all localities)); see also Powell, supra note 11, at 686-87 (articulating that
the "imposition of a congressional agenda on state institutions . . . 'drains the inven-
tive energy of state governmental bodies' by commandeering scarce resources of time,
attention, and public concern" (footnotes omitted)).
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must divert resources toward ensuring that the federal conditions are
properly attained."s Federal spending is "much more suspect constitu-
tionally than... federal regulation, because federal spending co-opts
local politicians by increasing the patronage available to them, thus debil-
itating the alternative sources of power in our federal structure."" 9
Thus, state and local leaders often are unable to respond adequately to
the concerns of their respective constituencies. This, in turn, subverts
citizens' local will and self-governance.
Recognizing the harms arising from the federal government compelling
states to require or prohibit certain acts, the 104th Congress enacted the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). ° As the name suggests, the
UMRA deals with unfunded mandates, not funded ones."' Limiting the
use of unfunded mandates, however, impacts the use of funded man-
dates. Assuming that Congress wishes to realize its objectives, the
UMRA, in addition to the Court's holdings in New York and Printz that
Congress cannot compel state officials to act, may effectively increase
conditional federal spending as a means to achieve those objectives. 52
Congress, therefore, may indeed be required to grant conditional funds,
insofar as the UMRA, New York, and Printz restrict Congress's "un-
funded" alternatives.
348. See generally Salkin, supra note 337, at 53-54 & n.14 (explaining that Congress
does not trust state or local officials to spend the money in accordance with
Congress's commands); Stewart, supra note 325, at 957-59.
349. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1141 n.171 (1987).
350. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1997)). An
unfunded federal mandate imposes duties upon state and local governments and di-
rects state and local governments to pay for their implementation. See Recent Legis-
lation, supra note 73, at 1469-71.
351. See Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1503
(1997)); Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 64 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1534
(1997)); Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 67 (1995) (codified at 2. U.S.C. § 1541 (1997)).
The UMRA also contains a broad list of exceptions. See Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat.
49 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1503 (1997)).
352. See Gillmor & Eames, supra note 71, at 415. Gimor and Eames explain that
the reverse may likewise be true: that limitations on federal spending through a bal-
anced budget amendment or otherwise might force Congress to impose unfunded
mandates in order to realize federal objectives. Id. They further explain that in order
to circumvent an act prohibiting or limiting unfunded mandates, Congress may instead
attach conditions to federal funds, although the "same problems would still exist at
the local level" that existed under a system of unfunded mandates. Id. at 416.
In light of the Court's holdings that the Constitution prohibits federal
commandeering of state legislative and administrative officials, were the
Court to reevaluate its presumption of validity of conditioned federal
funds in light of states' realistic economic position, the Court would
undoubtedly find many conditions to be coercive. As discussed below,
this Comment does not suggest that the federal government should ter-
minate funding to state and local governments, but rather that the funds
and any attached conditions must be tailored according to the
Constitution's limits on federal authority.3" Realistically, federal condi-
tions are often coercive, and the Court's continued reliance on the pre-
sumption that federal spending conditions are not inherently coercive is
troubling. Indeed, the nation has undergone vast changes since the Court
first maintained this presumption, and "[elarly in the history of federal
government assistance... such programs were few and funding small,
[and] ... the states generally had the easy alternative of declining the
money and avoiding the condition." " As discussed above, however,
"with the budgets of state and local governments now so greatly depen-
dent on federal money, the premise that the funds can readily be rejected
if the condition is deemed oppressive no longer seems realistic."
3 5
The New York Court appeared to acknowledge the potentially coercive
nature of federally conditioned funds. While finding that Congress may
not directly regulate states, New York indicates that Congress may devel-
op incentives or procedures, "short of outright coercion," that encourage
states to regulate in a specific manner."' The Court noted, however,
that conditional spending consistent with South Dakota v. Dole357 is ac-
ceptable."5 In light of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole and the
Court's opinions in New York and Printz, it is at least conceivable that
the Court will recognize that the current interpretation of the spending
power indeed enables the federal government to compel the "States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program,""' a result which New
York and Printz otherwise explicitly denounce.
353. See infra notes 401-36 and accompanying text (acknowledging Justice
O'Connor's approach as the most true to the history and text of the Constitution, and
the Court's spending power and Tenth Amendment decisions).
354. See Rosenthal, supra note 349, at 1162.
355. See id. (emphasis added); see also supra notes 270-72, 334-42 and accompa-
nying text.
356. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
357. 483 U.S. 203 (1987),
358. See id. at 167; supra notes 97, 100-08 and accompanying text (discussing the
New York Court's decision to uphold the monetary incentives in that case).
359. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997).
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3. The Supreme Court Relinquishes Its Proper Role by Permitting
Congress to Define the Scope of Federal Power
Perhaps foreshadowing the dangers of an unlimited spending power,
George Wharton Pepper, in his oral argument in United States v. But-
ler," attempted to persuade the Court to either restrict Congress or
relinquish the power of the judiciary and of the people to ensure Consti-
tutional principles.
It seems to me that a reversal of the judgment appealed from3' would justify
the conclusion that Congress, originating as a federal legislature with limited pow-
ers, has somehow transformed into a national parliament subject to no restraint
except self- restraint.
I venture to hope that the judicial power of the United States does not extend
to working any such transformation and that, to bring it about, we the people of
the United States must deliberately resort to the process of constitutional amend-
ment.'
During the term succeeding Butler, the Court refused to heed Pepper's
advice, instead rejecting it outright.' Thus, before New York, Lopez,
and Printz, the Court's role in assessing the federal-state balance was
virtually nonexistent, albeit self-imposed.3" With one broad stroke, the
Steward Machine, Helvering, Berman, and Buckley line of cases'
made evident what Madison proclaimed over 125 years before. Madison
believed that if Congress could legislate directly or through the spending
power for any "legitimate purpose," the effect would be to
360. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
361. In Butler, the Court's reversal of the circuit court would have approved of the
effectively-regulatory nature of the taxing and spending provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.
362. Id. at 24 (George Wharton Pepper, in oral argument for the respondents).
363. See supra notes 209-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's Depres-
sion era holdings).
364. This Comment does not discuss the relatively short-lived holding in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), in which the Court saw fit to
enforce the federal-state balance. Neither does this Comment discuss the holding in
Garcia, which overturned Usery and relinquished federalism's enforcement to "politi-
cal safeguards." See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
365. See supra notes 209-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holdings
that the general welfare is shaped by Congress, not by the courts or the states, and
that Congress's definition of the general welfare may not be judicially reviewable).
"exclud[e] the judicial authority of the United States from its participation in
guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the General and the
State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general welfare, being
questions of policy and expediency, are unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and
decision."m
Federalism was designed to protect individual liberties whereby the fed-
eral and state governments compete for the affections of the citizens and
guard against abuses of power by the other. 7 As a result, Madisonians
were concerned with the inability of the courts to ascertain the constitu-
tionality of legislative actions and to actually guard against abuses of
power.3  Although an exceptionally broad interpretation of any enu-
merated power might invoke this concern, a broad interpretation of the
spending power, modified by the General Welfare Clause, was of particu-
lar consequence. Nearly every congressional act could be characterized
as relating to the general welfare, and virtually every legislative act in-
volves the expenditure of money.' Steward Machine, Helvering, and
Buckley simply evidence the reticence with which courts review the con-
tent and meaning of the general welfare and, hence, legislation passed
pursuant to the spending power.370
366. Powell, supra note 284, at 663 (citation omitted) (quoting Madison's writings in
1817).
367. See supra notes 48-76 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes under-
lying the Framers' federalist design).
368. See Powell, supra note 284, at 662-63. Alexander Smyth noted the improbability
of "the constitutionality of an appropriation law being brought before the judiciary"
as a result of a broad interpretation of the spending power. See id. at 663; see also
supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive standing re-
quirements placed on private citizens challenging federal taxing and spending pro-
grams).
369. See Powell, supra note 284, at 663. Madison was concerned with the federal
government breaching its enumerated powers. See id. at 662. Thus, Madison observed
that, "The government therefore which possesses power in either one or other of
these extents, is a government without the limitations formed by a particular enumer-
ation of powers." Id. An interpretation of the spending power which permits Congress
to define the general welfare extends beyond even Hamilton's belief that the legisla-
tion must at least be general and national and not local. See Roger Pilon, On the
Folly and Illegitimacy of Industrial Policy, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 109-10
(1993). The danger Madison (and perhaps Hamilton) viewed was that under such an
interpretation, Congress would maintain the ability to spend in furtherance of truly
local concerns. See id. This danger is no more evident than through Congress's use
of conditional funding. See supra notes 284, 306-18 and accompanying text (discussing
spending power implications for the concept of enumerated powers).
370. Various theories have been advanced, as discussed in this section, regarding
whether the courts could adequately review the meaning of the "general welfare." It
is perhaps conceivable that the courts, in light of Lopez, might well have the ability
to review, as Hamilton observed, what is local and what is national-thus "gener-
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Some scholars and commentators suggest that this interpretation in
fact may be a partial repudiation of Marbury v. Madison.7' For Profes-
sor Van Alstyne, effectively allowing Congress to determine the scope of
the Tenth Amendment by permitting Congress to define the general wel-
fare is the "second death of federalism;""' indeed, before New York, the
Court was reluctant to review questions of federalism. 73
New York, Lopez, and Printz, however, indicate the desire on behalf of
the Court to review alleged federalism violations. For example, the New
York Court articulated that at least as far back as the decision in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee,374 "the Court has resolved questions 'of great impor-
tance and delicacy"' regarding the proper federal-state balance.' In
New York, Justice O'Connor further opined that "[tihe Tenth Amendment
thus directs us to determine ... whether an incident of state sovereignty
al"-in character. Justice O'Connor has argued,
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the
general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal
Government, is that the Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to
tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a
parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are
self-imposed."
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
371. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the Supreme Court, and not
Congress, declares "what the law is," by interpreting the Constitution and clarifying
constitutional boundaries). See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federal-
ism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1717-20 (commenting on the Court's then-recent decision
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
372. See Van Alstyne, supra note 371, at 1720. According to Professor Van Alstyne,
federalism first "died" in the wake of the Court's early decisions expanding federal
commerce power. See id. at 1711-12.
373. See id. at 1720 (citing Garcia). Professor Van Alstyne notes that Garcia found,
astonishingly, that the protections of federalism reside within the workings of the na-
tional government, and not with the Supreme Court. See id. In his dissent, Justice
Powell criticized this view as abandoning 200 years of the constitutional understand-
ing of federalism. See id. at 1721 (quoting Nine for the Seesaw, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
2, 1985 at 21). According to Professor Van Alstyne, and others, this view appears to
abandon the judiciary's role in interpreting and guarding against abuses of the Consti-
tution. See id.
374. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
375. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (quoting Martin, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) at 324).
is protected by a limitation on an Article I power."37 This understand-
ing anticipated that of the-Lopez Court.
Before its decision in Lopez, the Court held in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority377 that Congress, not the Court, was to
decide the scope of the commerce power and the offsetting weight of the
Tenth Amendment.37 However, the Lopez Court elucidated and expand-
ed the Court's role in assessing the balance of federalism in the Com-
merce Clause context, as evidenced by its decision to overturn an act
passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause for the first time in nearly
sixty years.
3 79
Moreover, notwithstanding that the Court often defers to Congress's
judgment,3" and that: the Constitution provides for the expansion of
federal power as the nation grows,3"' Justice Kennedy, in his concurring
opinion in Lopez, rejected the proposition that the Court "in every in-
stance... lacks the authority and responsibility to review congressional
attempts to alter the federal balance."83 Although "[t]he political
branches of the Government must fulfill this grave constitutional obliga-
tion" to protect and maintain the federal-state balance, "if democratic
liberty and the federalism that secures it were to endure,"' Justice
Kennedy recognized, "the absence of structural mechanisms to require
those officials to undertake this principled task, and the momentary
political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue
against a complete renunciation of the judicial role." ' Summarizing,
Justice Kennedy explained that because a proper federal balance was
"too essential" to the constitutional structure and "plays too vital a role
in securing freedom," the Lopez majority recognized its fundamental and
unique position to guard against either the state or federal governments
from "tipp[ing] the scales too far."385
376. Id. at 157; see Levy, supra note 341, at 500 (noting that New York "clearly
contemplates" a role for the Court that Garcia fundamentally rejected).
377. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
378. See Van Alstyne, supra note 371, at 1720.
379. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); supra note 121 and accompa-
nying text.
380. See id. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381. See id. at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at
157).
382. See id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
383. See id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that Madison had envisioned
that, to a certain degree, the political (i.e., elected) branches of government would
maintain a proper federal state balance according to the desire of the citizens).
384. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
385. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy further recognized that the
Court has actively engaged in maintaining a proper federal-state balance in numerous
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Before New York, Lopez, and Printz, the Court's role in ensuring a
proper federal-state balance was uncertain. Indeed, cases like Garcia,
which rejected a role for the Court, rested on an understanding that "po-
litical safeguards" would protect federalism. 6 These so-called political
safeguards included the states' indirect influence over the election of the
President and members of the House of Representatives as provided in
Article I, section 2, and Article II, section 1;" 7 the states' direct influ-
ence in the election of senators as provided in Article I, section 3 ;'
and the provisions in Article IV preventing a state's representation in the
Senate from being reduced without that state's consent. 9 This premise
is flawed, however. While the Framers originally may have designed the
Constitution to protect federalism, a conclusion which is by no means
foregone, modernly, "questions have been raised as to the extent to
which the political structure has changed.., to reduce the influence of
state and local governments... upon the selection and decisionmaldng
of federal officials."3" Of the shift in structural power, one governor re-
cently stated that the Framers intended discussions of federalism to
endure and provided the state and federal governments with the tools
with which to fight; over the course of the twentieth-century, however,
"the states have lost their tools... [and] have no way to push back.""1
Moreover, with respect to federal spending conditions, "political safe-
guards may be less, rather than more, effective ... than where direct
regulation is proposed" due to the often stealthy regulatory nature of
areas. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(abstention doctrine); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (absten-
tion doctrine); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rules for determining the
primacy of state law); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)
(the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983) (the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (doctrine of preemption); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (doctrine of preemption)).
386. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).
387. See id. at 550-51 (noting that the Constitution gives the states the ability to
influence electoral qualifications).
388. See id. (noting that the Constitution allows each state an equal representation
and that the original Constitution granted the legislature of each state power to se-
lect that state's senators).
389. See id.
390. See Rosenthal, supra note 349, at 1140-41.
391. See Liberty & Limits, supra note 2.
federal spending conditions. 92 Finally, the Court's refusal to limit Con-
gressional action based on "political safeguards" is itself inherently
problematic. "At most, the political safeguards argument makes a case
for judicial declarations of nonjusticiability. It does not support affirma-
tive judicial declarations that congressional legislation is consistent with
the original constitutional design." 93 Therefore, the Court's reliance on
political safeguards is troubling and unjustified. New York, Lopez, and
Printz signify the Court's desire to refrain from blindly relinquishing
federalism to Congress's whim.
The danger of the Court's broad judicial deference to Congress with
respect to spending power questions is no more evident than in reactions
to the Court's Tenth Amendment decisions circumscribing federal power.
Two examples of the status to which the Tenth Amendment has been
relegated may prove useful at this point. In early November 1996, the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in Printz." A newspaper article
discussing the case should be disconcerting to both the constitutional
scholar and the citizen alike. After asserting that the Court should uphold
the constitutional challenge, the author concluded by suggesting a means
for attaining the goals of the Brady Act, if indeed the Court struck down
the Act. "If Congress wants universal cooperation by sheriffs, experience
suggests that it has only to hold hostage continued federal law-enforce-
ment grants. New cruiser radios trump constitutional scruples almost
every time."39 Without proceeding quite so far, President Clinton sug-
gested as much in a press release responding to the Court's decision in
Lopez. The President vowed to attain the aims of the Gun Free School
Zones Act regardless of the Court's decision, by conditioning federal
funds on states' implementation of the act."
These two examples indicate that the Constitution-its federalist struc-
ture-is not the only entity fighting for its life. Indeed, the Court is fight-
ing for its own life. When journalists, scholars, and the President, among
others, suggest that the Court's rulings can be circumvented, the Court
must reassess its own validity. Unfortunately, not only has the Court
weakened the federalist structure, but the Court has weakened its own
authority in safeguarding the Constitution and ensuring the Constitution's
392. See Rosenthal, supra note 349, at 1142.
393. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 732 (1988) (footnote omitted).
394. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, Printz v United
States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
395. Sheriffs Have Gun Point, THE COMM'L APPEAL, Dec. 6, 1996, at 8A (emphasis
added).
396. See Todd S. Purdom, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al.
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commands. The spending power is no longer a means to undermine the
Constitution itself, but rather is now a means to subvert decisions of the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the Court explicitly approves the means; in-
deed, by expanding Congress's power, the Court is engaged in judicial
euthanasia. Our constitutional system is troubled when the Supreme
Court's invalidation of federalism violations may be constitutionally
ignored.
Although neither New York, Lopez, nor Printz are spending power
decisions, each indicates a desire on behalf of the Court to assert its
proper authority in protecting the Constitution. More importantly, the de-
cisions indicate the Court's desire to confine federal power according to
the Constitution. As such, both cases imply the possibility of reviewing
and confining other federal powers.
V. NEW YORK, LOPEZ, AND PRINTZ HINT AT THE PossIBILITY OF A SHIFT
TOWARD REMOVING THE SPENDING POWER AS AN IMPEDIMENT
TO A PROPER FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE
Should the Court reassess its current interpretation of the spending
power, drawing on the above discussion, the Court likely has four alter-
natives to the current understanding of the spending power. First, the
Court may require that federal expenditures further an enumerated pow-
er. This was Madison's view, that Congress's spending was limited to fur-
thering the enumerated powers.397 Second, the Court may limit federal
spending to furthering the general, that is national, welfare and prohibit
Congress's involvement in purely local matters. The Court may involve
itself in determining such a balance.' Third, the Court may review
conditions on federal grants less deferentially and with an eye toward
the realistic economic positions of the federal and local authorities. Fi-
nally, the Court may adopt Justice O'Connor's position in Dole, and the
majority's position in Butler, that conditions on federal funds must not
be regulatory in nature.'
397. See supra notes 188-90 (discussing the Madisonian view of the spending pow-
er).
398. As discussed above, however, even Madisonians recognized the problems courts
might face in attempting to review or define the general welfare. See supra notes
305-08, 369 and accompanying text (discussing the Madisonian view).
399. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
If the Court's decisions in Printz, Lopez, and New York are indeed
small steps toward a larger principle of effectuating the Constitution's
command for a proper federal-state balance, then the Court would most
likely begin reassessing the spending power by adopting the fourth alter-
native. Adopting this alternative would not necessarily alter the Court's
precedent,4" but would merely require the Court to defer less where
Congress appears to be using its conditional spending power to regulate
areas solely within the states' sphere of authority."'
In briefly discussing the spending power, the Printz majority indicated
that the spending power is not beyond judicial review. Justice Scalia, for
the majority, indicated that "it will be time enough [to review Congressio-
nal spending provisions] if and when their validity is challenged in a
proper case."4"
In addition to her Dole dissent Justice O'Connor hinted at the possibili-
ty of adopting such a position in her New York majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor somewhat caustically observed that "[w]hile the spending pow-
er is 'subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases,'
these restrictions have not been so severe as to prevent the regulatory
authority of Congress from generally keeping up with the growth of the
federal budget."4"3
Moreover, although the New York decision explicitly holds that condi-
tional federal spending presumptively falls short of an impermissible
level of coercion, curiously, Justice O'Connor chose to clarify only one
element of Dole in her discussion. Justice O'Connor explained that condi-
tions must bear a sufficient relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending principally because "otherwise, of course, the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of fed-
eral authority."4" Arguably, the Constitution's grants of and limits on
400. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has
consistently limited federal funding conditions to specifying how the money may or
must be spent).
401. Additionally, although the third alternative, deferring less to Congress when
conditional grants are involved and invalidating such conditions when coercion realis-
tically appears from the circumstances is appealing, the Court may decline such a
standard on the grounds that judicial standards are unworkable. See Soifer, supra
note 58, at 824-25 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(noting that this is the case even though a possible majority of the Court believes
that "'the legitimacy of Congress' [sic] power to legislate under the spending power
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
.contract"'"); Stewart, supra note 325, at 970-72.
402. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997) (alteration in original).
403. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
207).
404. See id. at 167 (emphasis added).
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federal authority are rendered academic by not requiring more than sim-
ply that the conditions bear some relationship to the purpose of the fed-
eral spending. Justice O'Connor clearly recognized this in her dissenting
opinion in Dole and would have prohibited Congress from regulating
through the spending power."5 However, her dissent on this same fine
point regarding the required relationship for conditional grants perhaps
explains why she chose to make this point in her New York opinion, and
additionally why she could not expand upon it.4"
Moreover, it is interesting that only a few terms earlier, Justice
O'Connor reiterated the Butler Court's warning of the dangers of an
uncontrolled spending power:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the general
welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal Government,
is that the Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to tear down the barri-
ers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole
people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed."4n
Similarly, Lopez, although elucidating the extent of the commerce
power, is both relevant and important to a discussion of the spending
power in two ways. First, Lopez indicates the Court's willingness to cir-
cumscribe federal power for the first time in over sixty years. Inasmuch,
arguably the time is ripe for the Court to develop further its understand-
ing of the Constitution vis-A-vis other federal powers.4" Having the duty
405. See supra notes 252-69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
dissent).
406. Justice O'Connor, as evidenced by the fact that she dissented in Dole, could
not command a majority for her view that a greater relationship be required. Like-
wise, perhaps Justice O'Connor continued to be unable to command a majority on
this point in New York, but nevertheless wanted to indicate her position again.
407. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)). Some scholars have suggested that
a majority of the Court is likely untroubled by the size and extent of the federal
government. See Pilon, supra note 293, at 1010. These comments, however, were
made before Lopez. Perhaps Justice O'Connor's apparent advocacy of the dangers of
an uncontrolled spending power, compared with her opinion in New York that condi-
tional federal spending does not reach "outright coercion," can be explained by sug-
gesting that a majority of the Court was unwilling at the time New York was decided
to limit federal power more than absolutely necessary, particularly the spending pow-
er.
408. Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated the Lopez majority's concern that the early
cases broadly interpreting the Commerce Clause "ushered in an era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Con-
to interpret the Constitution,4 the Court may reexamine its spending
power precedent in view of the development of the federal government
since the Court first held in Butler that the spending power is limited
only to furtherance of the general welfare,4 ° and has subsequently re-
assured in Steward Machine and Helvering that Congress has virtually
limitless deference to define the scope of the general welfare. 41' Thus,
although the New York Court curiously failed to propose a textual con-
struction of federal powers,412 the Lopez Court appears to have done
just that. Printz would appear to have taken this substantive construc-
tion even one step further.
Second the Court may be willing to specifically circumscribe the
spending power, given that it has interpreted the Commerce Clause and
spending power similarly, producing similar effects on Congressional
action."' Both the spending power and Commerce power have been in-
terpreted extremely broadly since the late 1930s, and have permitted
Congress the ability to regulate broadly."4 Lopez appears to mark a be-
ginning for the Court to circumscribe federal commerce power; having
interpreted both the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause broadly,
it is not implausible that the Court will, in the future, recognize that
circumscribing federal enumerated powers does little for federalism with-
out at the same time circumscribing the federal spending power. More-
over, while it may once have been true that "[i]f the front door of the
commerce power is open, it may not be worth worrying whether to keep
the back door of the spending power tightly closed,"4"5 Lopez indicates
that the Court is willing to reject some solicitors. Not only is it worth
confining the spending power, but it makes little sense not to do so.
gress." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
409. See id. at 575; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(holding that the judiciary has the sole duty to declare "what the law is").
410. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
411. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41, 644-45 (1937); Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937).
412. See Powell, supra note 11, at 669.
413. The Court has continually upheld spending power challenges, just as it did in
New York. However, as discussed, Justice O'Connor may have left open a narrow
window for challenging the spending power. See supra notes 404-08 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Justice O'Connor's potential narrow window). This Comment
merely attempts to draw an analogy to the Court's jurisprudence in related areas and
to indicate why continuation of the current spending power doctrine, while at the
same time reeling in other federal powers, renders federalism illusory.
414. See Pilon, supra note 293, at 1005-06; Pilon, supra note 370, at 110 (noting
that "[flike the General Welfare Clause, the Commerce Clause has also been convert-
ed from a shield to a sword").
415. Rosenthal, supra note 349, at 1131.
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Finally, Printz indicates the Court's continued commitment to enforc-
ing the guarantees of federalism and the Court's hesitance to distinguish
New York on a technical basis as the United States Government had ar-
gued."' This reluctance signifies, the Court's willingness to read feder-
alism as a substantive constitutional command. Justice Scalia's approach
to the federalism question is also useful for analyzing future questions of
federalism. The Court should not hesitate to apply this analysis to all fed-
eralism questions, especially to those concerning the spending power.
Indeed, even before announcing the Printz decision, Justice Scalia noted
that the issue of the spending power's infringement on federalism is one
of the most serious issues now confronting federalism.417
One recent decision suggests the possibility that courts may begin
to review congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power with greater scrutiny. In Virginia Department of Education v.
Riley,"' the Fourth Circuit embraced Justice O'Connor's dissent in
South Dakota v. Dole."9 Riley involved a federal statute which appar-
ently conditioned states' receipt of federal funds for education of dis-
abled students on the requirement that states "'assure[] all children with
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education.' 42 ° Pursuant
to this requirement, the federal government withheld Virginia's entire
sixty million dollar grant for disabled students under the statute upon
learning that Virginia had expelled 126 disabled students "for reasons
wholly unrelated to their disabilities."42' Holding that the statute did not
"unambiguously" condition states' receipt of these federal dollars as re-
416. Justice Scalia refused to distinguish New York on the ground that the Brady
Act did not diminish political accountability. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2382 (1997). Thus, Justice Scalia indicated, at least implicitly, that political ac-
countability, while important, is not necessarily the cornerstone of federalism. Instead,
the Constitution requires a proper federal-state balance; the benefits secured by feder-
alism are not dispositive, but are useful in determining federalism violations because
the Framers designed the federalist system to secure these advantages.
417. See Liberty & Limits, supra note 2.
418. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), superseded by statute, as recognized
by Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589 (4th
Cir. 1997).
419. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 570-71. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Dole, see supra note 243-59 and accompanying text.
420. Riley, 106 F.3d at 560.
421. See id.
quired by Dole, the court invalidated the federal government's withhold-
ing of federal education funds.422 The court explained,
Insistence upon a clear, unambiguous statutory expression of congressional intent
to condition States' receipt of federal funds in a particular manner is especially
important where, as here, the claimed condition requires the surrender of one of,
if not the most significant of, the powers or functions reserved to the States by
the Tenth Amendment-the education of our children.42
The court then proceeded to discuss the federalism and Tenth Amend-
ment implications of the federal government's decision to withhold such
education funds.4' Concededly, the court noted that a discussion of
federalism and the Tenth Amendment was helpful-although not neces-
sary-to its decision.4 ' Nevertheless, the court's discussion of federal-
ism is instructive. Citing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole, and the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Butler v. United 'States,426 the Riley court
found that the spending power prohibits such a "condition"-even as-
suming is was unambiguous. 4 7 The Riley court found that the condition
at issue was "considerably more pernicious than the 'relatively mild en-
couragement at issue in Dole."42 Withholding the pro rata share of
$58,000 attributable to the 126 expelled students, for example, "would be
'encouragement."'4  Withholding all of the sixty million federal educa-
tion dollars for Virginia's disabled students was not, however, "encour-
agement."430 The court explained that the condition instead "resem-
ble[d] impermissible coercion."" Moreover, the court explained that
the condition took the form of a regulation which Congress could not
impose through the Spending Clause power.3 2
422. See id. at 562-69.
423. Id. at 566 (citations omitted). Arguably, the Supreme Court should follow its
"germaneness" requirement-requiring a reasonable relationship between the condi-
tions and the destination of the federal funds-for the same reason.
424. Id. at 569-71.
425. Id. at 569. The court explained that its finding that Congress failed to unam-
biguously declare the "condition" completely disposed of the case. Id.
426. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).




431. Id. at 569.
432. Id. at 570.
Ultimately, if the Court meant what it said in Dole, then . . . a Tenth
Amendment claim of the highest order lies where, as here, the Federal Gov-
ernment . . . withholds the entirety of a substantial federal grant on the
ground that the States refuse to fulfill their federal obligation in some insub-
stantial respect rather than submit to the policy dictates of Washington in a
matter peculiarly within their powers as sovereign states . . . [In this case,]
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Citing in part to Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole and the Supreme
Court's opinion in Butler, the Fourth Circuit concluded its opinion with a
recitation of the impact of such a condition on principles of federalism:
In the end, this case... is about the extent to which the Federal Government
may, in our system of federalism, impose its policy preferences upon the States by
placing conditions upon the return of revenues that were collected from the
States' citizenry in the first place ... [ ] In our federal system of government,
such delicate policy decisions [as discipline of students], relating so intimately as
they do to matters within the exclusive prerogative of the States, are presumed to
be those of the States alone.... Even [when the Federal Government properly
conditions federal funds], of course, the Federal Government must effectuate that
expropriation in a manner that is faithful to the limitations on Federal power that
inhere in the Tenth Amendment and in the principles of federalism that undergird
our entire democratic system of governance.4"
As Riley makes clear, this Comment's suggestion that the Court review
federal spending more carefully does not require a significant departure
from the Court's spending power cases. Such a review requires only that
the Court seriously enforce its already-imposed requirements, namely
that the spending power not be used to coerce states, and that spending
conditions reasonably relate to the destination of the federal funds. Re-
garding the latter-the germaneness requirement-the Court's decision in
Butler, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole, and the Fourth Circuit's ap-
proach in Riley make clear that failure to seriously observe a reasonable-
ness requirement permits Congress to impermissibly regulate pursuant to
the Spending Clause power, where Congress might not be permitted to
so regulate pursuant to one of its enumerated powers. This is especially
true given the Court's decision in Lopez to read the Commerce Clause
more carefully: prior to Lopez, it is at least conceivable that many spend-
ing conditions bordering on impermissible regulation under the Spending
Clause might well have been upheld as proper regulations under the
Commerce Clause, given the Court's broad deference to Congress's legis-
lation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Lopez draws into question,
however, unlimited deference, and suggests that the Court will in the
future require more than blind deference to Congress. Finally, this Com-
coercion is . . . . an argument of fact . . . . [The condition] is . . . an act
more akin to forbidden regulation ....
Id.
433. Id. at 570-71. Ultimately, Congress enacted a statute superseding the Riley de-
cision. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public Safety and Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d
589 (4th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, the Riley court's enunciated principles of federalism
remain sound.
ment suggests that broad and untailored spending conditions permit the
federal government to commandeer the states into the service of the
federal government, in clear contravention of the Court's recent deci-
sions in Printz and New York, even when Congress enacts spending con-
ditions which regulate states pursuant to an enumerated power such as
the Commerce Clause.
If, as the Riley court explained, spending conditions must be unambig-
uous, especially when "the claimed condition requires the surrender of
one of, if not the most significant of, the powers or functions reserved to
the States by the Tenth Amendment-the education of our children,"4"
so too should courts prohibit spending conditions from coercing states,
or impermissibly regulating and thereby commandeering states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted and expanded the federal spending power, virtually
without limit. Inasmuch, the Court has permitted Congress to define the
scope of federal power. The Court has not granted Congress this latitude
with regard to any other power, and New York, Lopez and Printz con-
firm that the Court has recently elected to review federal powers with
greater scrutiny. In doing so, the Court has signaled a desire to return to
the Constitution's fundamental principles of federalism.
Prior to New York, Lopez and Printz, limitations on federal power
were tenuous at best. Limitations on the federal spending power remain
even more uncertain, however. This Comment has suggested that in or-
der to effectuate the Constitution's principles of federalism, the Court
must realistically examine uses of the spending power with the respec-
tive positions and choices of the federal and state governments in mind.
Without doing so, the Court permits its rulings to be subverted and ren-
ders illusory the protections against tyrannical majorities. The Court's
decisions in New York, Lopez and Printz hint at the possibility that the
Court will take seriously the federal government's coercive leverage un-
der the spending power as interpreted.
In the end, "states' rights" and "national rights" are not important. The
state governments and the federal government each have an appropriate
and indispensable role in the constitutional republic. The unique contri-
bution of the Framers to the country, and to the world, was a system of
powers divided between these two sets of governments. In this diffusion
lies the promise of liberty .for all citizens. Without the ability to know
precisely which of the two governments to hold accountable for various
434. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
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actions, whether disfavored or otherwise, citizens are unable to choose
how they wish to be governed. In a nation whose founders fought
against "taxation without representation," few things are as important as
the ability to hold elected representatives accountable.
In light of the nation's rich history, and in light of its recent decisions,
the Court should review the current interpretation of spending power in
order to effectuate principles of federalism. Refusal to confine Congress's
use of the Spending Power Clause -is inconsistent with both history and
the constitutional principles underlying the Court's recent jurisprudence.
Perhaps Justice Scalia best summarized the greatest problem now facing
federalism:
A federalist system will not work when the people have come to look upon the
national government as the solution of first resort.4
Lest its teachings be rendered meaningless, the Court should enforce
constitutional and jurisprudential limits on the Spending Clause Power.
RYAN C. SQUIRE*
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